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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the phenomenon of time and decision-making in schools by asking 
the phenomenological question ' What does it look like to make decisions (relative to time and 
temporal situatedness)? ' It explores this question by working through the ideas of Heidegger's 
Nothingness, Merleau-Ponty's corporeality, van Manen's hermeneutics, Habermas' crisis, 
Bollnow's critique, Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's poststructuralism, Nietzsche's free will, 
Innis' political history, Walker's music history, Hargreaves' Critical Theory, Mazis' dance, 
Morgan's metaphors, Wittgenstein's language logic, and Casey's remembering. Essentially, the 
thesis attempts to raise to awareness the intellectual pause, the moment that gives us deep 
appreciation for our roles as decision-makers and an awareness of decisions about to be made. If 
we are nothing more than movers-moving-in-endless-motion through a spiraling maze of 
decision-making, then as situated beings we are faced with the possibility of thinking ourselves 
back to awareness, thus entering into genuine dialogue with one another. 
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PROLOGUE 
Dear reader, welcome. I am glad that you have somehow stumbled upon my work. I find 
that lifeis full of interesting discoveries. And, as educators or individuals involved in the 
communication of ideas, we are, in one way or another, in the business of discovery. It's 
interesting how we discover things. For instance, this work may have been referred to you, or you 
may have stumbled upon it while searching for reference material, or the title may have caught 
Ib 1% 
your eye as you browsed the library shelve. This brings me to the first point that I need to bring to 
your attention, if you are to seriously consider this work. To be honest, it is more than 
just a point to be made, it is a confession. The title is a lie. It is a cruel, cheap, trick to lure my 
audience. But for this sin I find some consolation in knowing that all audiences are willing 
victims. Here is your chance to walk away. Simple stop reading, close the book cover, and no one 
will ever be the wiser. Oh, too late, you're still reading. Well, let's continue then. 
Vaclav Havel, the playwright and first president of the post-Cold War Czech Republic, 
once said in an interview, "Mcdern man must descend the spiral of his own absurdity to the 
lowest point; only then can he look beyond it. It is obviously impossible to get around it, jump 
over it, or simply avoid it." The title of my work is such an absurdity. You will find that after 
your first reading of the text that the ideas presented are anydung but simple steps to follow. In 
fact, there is nothing in the text that remotely resembles a "how to" manual. So, what does this 
mean? Well, it means that it is a waste of time, if your intention is to find the secret formula to 
leadership success. There are many published works that successfully outline formulas, and I 
encourage you to seek out the best of them, and take the time to read them carefully. However, if 
your interest lies elsewhere, somewhere in the realnl of curiosity and discovery, then I encourage 
you to take the time to read and re-read what I have taken the time to write. So, what is the 
purpose of having an absurd title? The clearest way I could explain it is by refemng you to listen 
to John Cage's masterpiece, four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence. And, if you are the 
more adventurous type, you may try your hand at herding cats. (If you are a practicing teacher, 
you get the point. If you are about to embark on a teaching career, bless you.) 
In writing this work, I did not have a clear audience in mind. This is my second 
confession. The truth is that what has been transcribed in the pages that follow is a dialogue with 
myself. Sun Tzu, whose ideas exploded into the corporate world of the 1980s, has said, 'if you 
know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.' Stated 
differently, the only person we can truly come to know is ourselves. Perhaps, Ghandhi said it 
best, "we must be the change we wish to see in the world." And, in the tradition of self- 
discovering journeys, I have gone on an intellectual walkabout. What is always interesting about 
such journeys is that strangers choose to walk with you for a while, until they must rest, or their 
interest or commitments take them someplace else. But as a result of that temporary encounter 
one walks away a little richer with self knowledge. There is much to be said about walking and 
talking, and even more to be said about stopping to listen. I do not know who you are and you do 
not really know me. 'So, in this way, we are strangers who would normally cross each other on the 
street without giving a second thought as to the significance of the other. Yet, here you are 
reading what I think. Indeed, reality is stranger than fiction. 
There are different ways of reading a text, similar to how there are different ways of 
acting. For example, one would read Ariel Dorfman's political classic, How To Read Donald 
Duck, much differently from Walt Disney's comics about the famous talking anatidae. Roland 
Barthes, whose work centres on the myth of language or semiotics, has said, " the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author." This brings me back to the title of my 
work. I refer to "five steps" but really what I am alluding to is the missing step. And for the sake 
of giving it a name, let us call this step metaphorical discourse. This is to say, the nature of a 
phenomenological-hermeneutical text is to engage the reader in a way that brings one into the 
experience being described. Visualization is important here. This literary trick, if you like, serves 
two purposes. First, it is much easier to grasp the gist of an idea if one can create a mental image 
of what such an idea might look like in the real world. The value of a tangible image is that it acts 
as a point of reference, which the reader should feel free to embrace or replace. This brings me to 
the second function of visualization. In the metaphorical sense, a mental image should capture the 
J 2 ~ l  of the experience being described. As such, I encourage you to interact with the text, to ask 
yourself 'Is the image being presented consistent with how I would visualize the experience?' and 
you may find that, on occasion, you may need to think deeply about your own mental images. 
In a way, it is my intention that this work act as a reminder, like a string tied to your 
finger, that the only place you really are is in the here and now. The problem is that we do not 
have a language for the here and now. At best, we can utter wishful thoughts (e.g., "What I'm 
trying to say.. . "). This is not to say, we do not experience the moment in the flesh. In fact, our 
bodies are communicating with us all the time through feelings and sensations. But, we have not 
developed a language to intelligently express what we are experiencing as the moment unfolds 
itself before us. Instead, we live in the security of distracted language, of what we just did or are 
about to do. But to be-in-the-now is a discomforting feeling. For example, think about times 
when you talked to someone about giving a speech and actually giving the speech. In a way, we 
could say, we are in conflict whenever our mental image of how we see ourselves acting in the 
world is confronted with how we actually act in the world. It is the conflict that arises out of an 
awareness of difference that creates the possibihty of becoming aware of being-in-the-now. To 
come back to the title, when confronted with the body of the text, "five simple steps" is in 
conflict. What I'm trying to say is that it is with this appreciation for conflict and awareness of 
difference that you should engage with this text. If I have any role to play in this, then let my 
function be that of a narrator, so that the text may speak for itself. 
A university thesis is divided into five general areas: introduction, literature review, 
methodology, analysis, and conclusion. I have titled each of my section different from the norm, 
although the generaI"purpose of each section still serves to meet the more conventional 
expectations. So, for all intended purposes, Step 1 can be read as the introduction, Step 2 as the 
literature review, Step 3 as the methodology, Step 4 as the analysis, and Step 5 as the conclusion. 
Without giving away the plot, the text has been constructed like a play (i.e., Waiting For Godot), 
and as the curtain closes on each scene, if you like, the reader is meant to be moved one step 
hrther away from the concrete ideas of common sense onto the abstract realm of the absurdity of 
our common sense; and as the play comes to an abrupt end the reader is left conscious of where 
one is situated, and, perhaps more importantly, one walks away with greater awareness of others. 
Yet, the play does not end, it has merely been interrupted, as one moves from a formal to an 
informal setting. For the next scene takes place outside "the theatre," as people walk and talk, 
while others stop to listen. It is this unscripted scene that gives life to this work, which is nothing 
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more than a play on words. 
A question I occasionally asked myself as I was writing my thesis was Why this? Why 
now?' Has there not been enough said about time, decision-making, and leadership? The answer 
is yes, yes, yes to each of these areas, and yes to works that address all these areas combined. But 
a problem that has bugged me over the years is why is it -- given the vast amount of available 
literature on making schools a better place -- that we are stuck in a cycle of recurring problems, 
some dating back to the ancient Greeks. And what I came to realize was that we complicate the 
simple and simplify the complex. In other words, we confuse ourselves to the point that we don't 
know which way is up, and opt instead to inconspicuously walk past the tangled mess of political 
"solutions" as we try to survive yet one more day of organized chaos. Although the words "time" 
and "decision-making" appear repeatedly in my work, you will find conspicuously absent the 
word "leadership" (other than in Chrispeels and Martin and Morgan). The reason for this is that 
since leadership is not an administrative title but an act of organization, an area I needed to better 
understand was the relationship between time and decision-making. This has led me to my thesis 
statement. Through the use of metaphorical discourse I will deconstruct the dialectical 
relationship of (organizational) time and (human) temporality to raise to awareness the 
intellectual pause, the pre-decision-making moment. As such, this phenomenological- 
hermeneutical text keeps returning to the question What is it like to make decisions?' 
STEP 1 
FINDING THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE 
What are we doing here, that is the question. And we are blessed in this, 
that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one 
thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come- 
(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act 11) 
Crisis? What Crisis? 
Crisis is the4mpetus to social change, has argued Habermas. Yet each crisis carries the 
seeds to a particular set of actions. For example, the crises that resulted in the revolutions of the 
United States, France, and Russia differ from the crises that resulted in McCarthyism, French 
colonial rule of Algeria, and Stalinism. The critical question, then, is not whether a crisis exists 
but, rather, how is a particular crisis being defined. 
What is the crisis in education? The answer to this question depends on lived 
experiences. For instance, the educational crisis of high-risk communities differs from that of 
upwardly mobile communities; public schools have a different educational crisis from 
independent schools; the educational crisis of the industrialized world differs from that of the 
developing world; so on and so forth. Nonetheless, a crisis exists in education, or stated 
differently, a univerqal theme of crisis is present in education. But how do we know that this 
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crisis is present? The one word answer is the "frustration" felt by teachers, students, 
administrators, parents, and brought to surface by educational experts. In part, the frustration 
stems from the paradoxical relationship between the work that needs to be done and the amount 
of available time, of which there is an increasing amount of the former and ever diminishing 
amount of the latter. Yet, we manage to "pull it off '  each and every day, because we have found 
ways to navigate through the hurricane of time, which continuously rushes the process of 
decision-making. The purpose of this thesis is to raise to awareness the intellectual pause, the 
moments that give us deep appreciation for our roles as decision-makers and an awareness of 
decisions about to be made. As such, by deconstructing the dialectical relationship of 
(organizational) time and (human) temporality this phenomenological-hermeneutical text keeps 
returning to the question What is it like to make decisions?' 
Bollnow (1987), the German pedagogist and phenomenologist, creates a dialectical 
relationship between crisis and critique, as the possibility for catastrophe coexisting with the 
possibility for resolution. He notes that both words "crisis" and "critique" stem from the same 
Greek root, Krinein, meaning purification. Bollnow argues that human beings are under constant 
threat of going astray, "already always in a condition of corruption:" phenomenologically in a 
state of inauthenticity, theologically in a state of sin. As such, one is continuously attempting to 
find a way back. But this is not a "return" to a place that existed before. Instead, it is a coming 
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back to an authentic way of being. In this way, the human condition is one of continuous 
rejuvenation, of the possibility of being born time and again. Yet, Bollnow argues that this 
Rousseaunian "return to nature" is not an escapist flight to the illusion of a paradise lost, but a 
genuine questioning to discover an authentic state of being. This is to say, critique demands the 
justification of a self-evident reality. As such, critique does not imply the existence of a reality 
but, rather, points to a "human judgement about reality." For Bollnow, crisis, as the possibility for 
catastrophe, makes evident the possibility to restore our oneness with the world. Henceforth, 
authenticity becomes the work of the critical person, who in crisis gives birth to a purer sense of 
self and in critique creates crisis (Ch. 1). 
Max van Manen (1990), the Canadian pedagogist and phenomenologist, suggests that to 
understand lived exderience in a tangible way requires a critical process of dismantling the webs 
of meaning. We may acquire a better glimpse into why we do the things we do by identifying 
specific themes and their relationship to the broader themes (existentials) of living. Yet, this can 
be a monumental undertaking, given that who we are is a complex entanglement of recollections 
of past experiences, desires of who we wish to be, perceptions of who we think we are, and 
negations of the things we want to avoid, all of which construct our beingness at conscious and 
subconscious levels. Consequently, one is in constant danger of falling victim to what Merleau- 
Ponty has called the "reductions" of lived experience - attempts at surfacing profundities. At best 
we can present supeificial utterances of superimposed structures, whose explanations are self- 
serving and shed light on their own fabricated existence. Where, then, is an inquisitive person to 
begin the journey of understanding? Merleau-Ponty suggests that perception requires the use of 
all our physical senses to connect with "the silence of primary consciousness ... the core of 
primary meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (Raymond, p. 273). 
In the early 1990s, the American government commissioned a series of studies on the 
quality of public education in the United States. In 1994, one of these studies, the National 
Educational Commission on Time and Learning (n! E. C. T. L.), presented its findings. The report 
begins with the statement " Our schools and the people involved with them - students, teachers, 
administrator, parents, and staff - are prisoners of time, captive of the school clock and calendar" 
(Kane, p.9). The Commission notes that research (Resnick, 1992) " evidence suggests that more 
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time will be required'if students are to meet the standards" (Kane, p. 16). However, " there is not 
enough room in our crowded school days to focus on achieving rigorous academic standards" 
(Kane, p.2 1). Consequently, rectifying the "design flaw" of schools "requires changes in how we 
organize teaching and learning so that all students are given the time necessary to succeed to high 
levels" (Kane, p. 22). The Commission goes on to recommend, as a possible solution, the 
implementation of non-graded school progranis, where students progress according to 
demonstrated skills rather than by age level (Kane, pp. 24-26). In addition, a broader spectrum of 
assessment and evaluation needs to be implemented, because research (Knapp & Turnbull, 1990; 
English, 1987; Haynes & Chalker, 1992; Walberg, 1988; Epstein & Mac Iver, 1992; Resnick & 
Klopfer, 1989) indicates that "teaching to the test" reduces learning to rote practices and does 
little to foster higherJevel learning (Kane, p.27). Furthermore, school organized extra-curricula 
programs are a proven mechanism (Task Force on Youth Development and Community 
Programs, 1992; Fuligni & Stevenson, 1993; Medrich & Marzke, 199 1; Holland & Andre, 1987) 
to counter the effects of negative social influences outside the school day (Kane, pp. 32- 36). 
Moreover, the Commission notes that professional development needs to be at the heart of 
positive change in schools, in order to counter the fact that most often teachers are self taught 
because, as research shows (Honey & Henriques, 1993), "appropriate professional development 
and support is virtually nonexistent in schools" (Kates, p. 43). 
The sentiments expressed in the N.E.C. T.L. report have been echoed by British 
,.. 
Columbia's Ministry of Education. In 2003, the Ministry released its findings on the quality of 
education in the province. Tlie government has made a number of recommendations to improve 
student learning. Generally, its recommendations aim to broaden the type of assessment and 
evaluation of students to ensure student improvement regardless of skill levels (i.e., socio- 
economic backgrounds and learning needs). There is to be an increase in parent participation in 
their children's learning both at home and school. There is to be greater teacher participation in 
local decision-making through professional learning communities. School improvements are to be 
monitored by school growth plans and student performance in provincial testing, with monetary 
rewards for the top performing schools, teachers and students (Ministry). 
What is "the problew" ? 
Essentially, there is an ever-increasing burden being placed on schools at all levels. 
Although the aim is to bring about change for the better, one of the major questions is how well 
are the goals for improvement matched to the organizational realities of each particular school 
community. At one level of administrative decision-making, there is the challenge of having the 
required resources to get the job done well. At another level, there is the challenge of identifying 
the best objectives: balancing 'What we need to do?" with 'What can we really do?" Moreover, 
there is the further question of human capacity: What is required to internally motivate a school 
community to bring io fruition the necessary changes needed to make a real difference in 
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education? Structural changes to a school organization, such as those recommended by the 
NE.C.T.L. or the B. C. Ministry of Education, will not in themselves bring about the desired 
change in behaviour. This is to say, structural changes must be accompanied by changes in the 
way we think, speak, and experience schools. 
Chrispeels and Martin (2000) conducted a study to identify the impact of leadership 
change in schools. They studied four middle schools involved in the California School 
Leadership Team Professional Development Program. Since 1993, the California School 
Leadership Academy has been operating a program to develop School Leadership Teams, 
whereby groups of teachers train over a 15 day period, and then return to their schools to form part 
of administrative teams. At the t h e  of the report, the researchers noted that School Leadership 
Teams were in effect' in over 300 schools across the State of California (p.334). Philosophically, 
Chrispeels and Martin (2000) ground their study on the work of system theorists (Hanna, 1997; 
Scott, 1992; Hallinan, 1987; Joyce, Hersh, & McKibbin, 1983; Leithwood & Seashore Louis, 
1998) who characterize schools as "open systems that must interact with the environment to 
preserve their inherent organizational structure" (p. 331). The results of the study were varied: 
"Part of the difficulty," note the researchers, "...is that each system is unique and there is no set 
formula to follow" (p.362). For instance, team roles differed due to "the interaction among pre- 
existing organizational structures and political and cultural norms and expectations of 
relationships between the principal and the team. the team and other committees, and the team 
and other teachers"(p.352). The researchers suggest in their findings that "although teams wanted' 
to take up new rolesbnd use their expert power. they often faced considerable challenges when 
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they re-entered their schools to face pre-existing structures and relational factors"(p.35 1). What is 
telling about this study, in relation to our discussion, is that social change is an idiosyncratic 
process, where each organization behaves differently, even when attempting to implement similar 
organizational changes. 
Within the daily reality of teachers and principals there is a feeling of being 
overwhelmed, like an ant under the shadow of the foot of a giant. Subsequently, for reasons of 
personal equilibrium or career advancement, we learn to live with the problems, the 
contradictions, the dichotomies, the ironies and oxymorons. We come to view them as inherent 
. , 
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tensions in education with periodic moments of crisis that arise when the contradictions become 
too apparent to the electorate, forcing the construction of new solutions, until their inherent 
contradictions also become too obvious to hide. (Hence is born the cynical, the apathetic, and the 
self-serving career educator.) However, the feeling of being overwhelmed only manifests itself 
when we are forced to think about the problems due to the collapse of constructed solutions; 
otherwise, problems are institutionally forgotten as they become reduced to administrative 
procedures (e.g., the routine call home when a student misses class or the checklist report card). 
This is to say, due to the high maintenance nature of curriculum delivery, educators tend to 
reduce innovative and dynamic solutions to applications that are quick and easy to implement. 
There is a broad range of reasons for why this occurs, from conflicting philosophies of education 
within a school setti& to the politics of territoriality to competing demands for limited resources, 
to mention a few. As a result, schools often implement mediated solutions that tend to 
superficially address problenls, partly in order to relieve political pressures. At best, this allows 
educators to buy some time, and have a temporary reprieve from the distraction of having to be 
pre-occupied with finding solutions to appease the electorate. Consequently, this form of control 
management structurally inhibits the open dialogue that is fundamental to both the sincere 
implementation of behaviour-changing conlmunity-wide programs and the creative decision- 
making that directs such implementation. 
Is there time for creative decision-making? 
Schools are constructions based on polar opposites, independent systems orbiting the sun 
of education. At on&nd of the spectrum lies the mechanical system of bureaucratization, and at 
the other end, its polar opposite, the organic system of learning. Ironically, we bring these two 
systems together into a strenuous, if not unstable, system called a learning organization (a.k.a. the 
school). Nonetheless, these two systems are able to sustain their orbits, and out of their 
momentum they construct the identities we call teachers, students, and principals. Yet, each of 
these roles has inherited the contradictions of the energies that created them. Thus is born a crisis 
for the educator out of these differences, making evident the presence of opposites which, 
although pulling at each other, tend to have shared intentions: the sustainability of the unity of 
'-. 
difference we call schools. The implication is that these opposites remain married not because 
they have no choice but for exactly the opposite reason; the closed structure of bureaucratization 
and the open structure of learning form a covenant to remain in orbit with one another, because, 
by harvesting the energy of their tensions, oppositional forces give rise to creativity, the source of 
sustainability. 
Creativity does not occur in the familiarity of one's taken for granted living world, 
however, whether it is the living world of school administrators or the living world of teachers. 
On the contrary, creativity flourishes in the realm that lies between systems. It is at the event 
horizon, the place where meaning is constructed (later to be managed within systems) in which 
exists the possibility for authentic awareness. Let us call this inbetweenness zero, that realm 
outside construction.((yet becoming a construction at the point of being given a meaning when 
. . 
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spoken, even if that meaning has no value). We may not be able to plan authentic moments, but 
we can learn to recognize and appreciate then1 when they do occur. And I would suggest, once we 
develop a sensitivity for authentic experience, as genuine thinkers and speakers, we can begin to 
construct a system of progressive movement based on a deeper appreciation for the things we do. 
This means that we must make time for authenticity; or, more specifically, we must know how to 
come to those moments when authenticity is a possibility. But this does not mean that we are to 
conquer time: rather, we need to become aware of its many manifestations, so that we may learn 
how to come to and be with one another 
Time is one of the most valuable resources in the daily life of schools. Yet, what do we 
mean by time when we speak of it in terms of implementing better ways of doing things in our 
schools? One distinction that can be made is between bureaucratic time and human time (or 
temporality), where the former is chronological, compartmentalized and associated with scientific 
management (e.g., Taylor and Michels), while the latter is exploratory, accidental and associated 
with the poetry of experience (e.g., Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty). I will return to these two 
notions of time in Step 4. Another distinction is that time, as an organizational tool, serves two 
meaningful purposes, which can be distinguished between justijcation of activity and movement. 
First, time is a superficial dressing, placed over the open-endedness of human activity, 
which allows organizational members to con~municate with one another in an attempt to justifL 
activity. This is the &nguage of planning and scheduling, and subsequent rescheduling and 
redefining previously set objectives. Here, competence is judged by the ability to meet 
(re)defined goals and incompetence is the failure to meet schedules, or, more honestly stated, the 
failure to redefine objectives. In this sense, time is an exercise in backward mapping: "Let's see 
where we have ended up, and then construct a narrative that makes sense to our particular 
organizational culture, showing that the beginning (as now stated) has led to the present 
outcome." 
While it is obvious that this use of time can become a corruption to serve personal gains a 
la 1984, I would suggest that this practice exists in organizations for exactly the opposite reason. 
What I mean is that administrative competence is to a great extent the ability to redefine a 
changing situation. 4 s  a result, time, in the context of planning, becomes an educated guess about 
I-. . 
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the unknown future, given what has already transpired. In this way, wise decision-making 
becomes the recognition that one cannot force an outcome, but, instead, one needs to look for 
ways to seize an opportunity as it presents itself in order to direct events toward a favorable end. 
Sometimes administrators win in this gamble, sometimes they lose, but most times it allows 
administrators to say "At least now we know where we are, so let's plan where we go from here." 
Second, time is a personal referencing to movement. This means that movement is 
defined by temporal space: I am, I was, I will be. Consequently, time, whether stated as "limited" 
or "unlimited," structures the speed and the type of activity. Time, therefore, allows us to situate 
ourselves in reference to forward movement by asking leading questions: Am I ahead? Am I on 
schedule? Have I fallen behind? In this sense, time is an exercise in forward mapping: "As a 
productive human being, my life has significance by what I have accomplished, and my life not- 
yet-lived has value, not so much by what 1 have done, but by what remains to be done." 
Time, as forward mapping, constructs for us a rule of first encounter. Although the Grand 
Narratives of life may tell us that that which is for us a first encounter has already always 
existed, this does not change the reality that for us it remains thefirst time. Stated differently, the 
force we call time occupies that intuitive unspoken space which drives us to action. For example, 
a student may run to class when she hears the Lunch warning bell. Central to this process is the 
ability to read the signs by interpreting gut feelings. However, it is important to note that time as 
a personal referencirig to movement requires that one buy into what is being decided in a given 
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period of time. For example, a Grade Ten student who is keen on a post secondary education may 
run to class when she hears the warning bell, but a student who is thinking about dropping out of 
school may not even go to class 
A simple reality often overlooked, due to its taken for granted status, is that the world 
around us exist only for us. This holds true of the cities we live in as well as the mountains we 
admire. This is a fundamental reality of our existence: "The world exist because we exist, and 
when we cease to exist so does the world." The implication is that to speak of a world that was 
here before each individual comes to experience it and that it will continue after one's passing is 
itself a construction. For our living in the world is what we truly know to be real. Simply stated, 
"All things exist for me, because I am the one who is experiencing, feeling, and thinking." 
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Obviously, an immtiture form of this sense of self is egocentrism, but also we must recognize that 
the narratives of history and fiiture have been constructed precisely to create a sense of history 
and future. Time as a phenomenon, then, requires that we return to the moments themselves. In 
essence, it is not time that has any real value, but, rather, the decisions we make to construct our 
lived experiences. 
To illustrate, I once taught in an independent school operated by a religious community 
where there was an ongoing concern with student tardiness. When I started at the school, I was 
informed that, in the past, this problem had been dealt with through the use of detentions. This 
seemed somewhat unfair, since all students were driven to school by parent drivers; consequently, 
students were not in control of the transportation arrangements. Often, parent drivers picked-up 
children from a number of homes, and for a range of reasons these students arrived late to school. 
Yet, in order not to create conflict with parents, all of who were members of the religious 
community, the school board opted to reprimand the children through detentions, presumably, 
hoping that parents would get the message. Needless to say, this manner of dealing with tardiness 
was frustrating parents, board members, students and teachers, resulting in a cycle of blame. To 
break this cycle, teachers hosted a forum to discuss the problem of tardiness (among other 
concerns), and all parents, students and board members were invited. Interestingly enough, on the 
topic of tardiness there was community consensus, including many personal statements 
concerning better time ,-_ management. Since that meeting, tardiness, in general, began a gradual 
decline. In retrospect, it seems that the major impact of the meeting was the self-awareness that 
developed in those who attended. Obviously, there was the underlying good will of a community 
that needed to work together. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the community meeting 
served as a reminder of the need to work together, which somehow had becomeforgotten in the 
familiarity of daily routines, of which school tardiness had become an all too familiar occurrence 
(reluctantly) accepted. 
An awareness of time relative to decision-making requires of us an intellectual 
maturation to strengthen our capacity for deep appreciation. This, in turn, requires a means by 
which to genuinely speak about authentic experience. Incidentally, one cannot think authenticity. 
One can, however, feel authenticity. What one can think, therefore, are genuine thoughts, where 
genuine thinking works dialectically to raise to awareness the presence difference; thus, dialectics 
becomes a thinking through the structuralization of difference. For difference results from the 
strenuous relationship of the contradictions that form sameness. As such, the existence of 
difference gives us, at least, the possibility for moments of authenticity. And, if authenticity 
requires awareness, then the experience of difference is central, because we become aware when 
that which goes unnoticed becomes distinct. For example, when we travel to a new place, 
everything is amplified for us, and we become keenly aware of our surroundings. For a period of 
time we are acutely aware of the taken for granted familiarities of home, such as being in a car or 
walking down the stfeet. . , This temporary state of distinction, which arises from living in a 
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different place, makes us appreciative of the things back home. Consequently, when we return 
home we are just as aware of living in a place that has not yet reverted to routine. To a great 
extent, this is a sensing awareness, an awareness of odors, sounds, and sights. We find ourselves 
in this heightened state when we come upon new situations. But over time, as the new world falls 
back to its state of forgotten everydayness, we become aware of altogether different things; things 
which had previously gone unnoticed. This second, later, level of awareness concerns the 
unwritten rules of behaviour, the politics and the Politics of organizations. It is at this level where 
we become aware of the many problems that form the bulk of decision-making in schools. 
What is the end and what are the means? 
Effective schools are the product of good decision-making, where the effectiveness of 
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decisions is measured by their profitable returns. Here, I refer to projt  in terms of personal 
enrichment and mutual gain; be it a student who finally understands a concept, a teacher who has 
found a way to reach a difficult student, or a principal who has resolved a conflict with a parent. 
Profitable decisions require timing: making the right decision at the right time. Incidentally, an 
organizational authority wields the power to give or take away time, depending on its buying into 
an idea. Consequently, the political maneuvering of the many competing stakeholders becomes 
one of time allocation by reason or force. 
However, time and decision-making form a paradoxical relationship as ancient as the 
Grecian world of gods and mortals. For the Greeks, time was the product of the gods, the god 
Kronos to be precise, while decision making was the endeavor of mortals, such as the dialectics 
of Socrates or the paradoxes of Zeno. Through the ages, Greek thought has remained resilient, in 
part, due to the universal appeal of its creative powers of the human intellect; for, as Keats 
reminds us in Ode on a Grecian IJrn, " When old age shall this generation waste, Thou shalt 
remain." Ever since the rediscovery of Greek thought, mankind has struggled to conquer time, 
from the alchemy of Nostradamus to the physics of Einstein. Yet in an effort to make gods out of 
mortals, we have failed to heed the warnings of the likes of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein; whose 
macabre tale warns that the relentless pursuit to create a modern day Hercules from a Nietzschean 
superman can only r,esult in a monstrosity void of a caring humanness. 
,1,, 
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If, in the end, we are capable of surpassing time by quantum leaps, we may inadvertently 
also leave behind our humanity. In the absence of a grounded commitment to being human (with 
an ideal of an altruistic utopia), post-industrial decision-making is bound to leap into self- 
servehood (with an ideal of becoming kings in a Global Village). Henceforth, in a post-time 
existence, the intentionality of decisions is post-apocalyptic, a Derridean rapture, where those left 
behind metamorphose into Kafkean cockroaches, scurrying to avoid the hoofs of Orwellean pigs 
mimicking human behaviour for the sole purpose of forming a new world order that profits from 
-- not with -- human beings. The end of time marks the end of the historic project of 
emancipatory democracy, of true choice and self-determination. It condemns poets like Ken Saro- 
Wiwa to eternally hang from a post-colonial nose. To believe in the likes of Habermas and 
Foucault is tantamoiiit to accepting this prediction. To believe in the likes of Richard Rorty and 
Daniel Bell is to reject it. 
My purpose, here, is to foster awareness of the relativity of time to decision-making by 
thinking about the distinctions that form our natural activities, as well as construct differences 
into structural dichotomies with the intention of clarifying to ourselves the point that separates 
one decision from another. It is not my intent to deconstruct the intentionality of decision- 
making, other than to raise to awareness the invisible boundaries that frame decision-making; be 
it a Foucaultean infekno or a Bellean paradise found. Nor is my intent to enter into a systems 
discourse over schools of thought, other than to raise to awareness the cultural blinders of 
organizational paradigms. This type of eiiher/or analysis is the innate tradition of WesternINew 
World thinking that we postics have inherited as a mortgaged future and to which we must 
acknowledge our indebtedness. Nonetheless, the work here is to return to the authenticity of 
decision-making, a genuine thinking back to an awareness, to an appreciation, of what it looks 
like to make decisions. Thus begins our journey East, as Bollnow suggests, to a place which 
neither occupies space nor time, but is a poetic threshold to "the return of the human being to his 
[or her] essential origin .... consummated within the individual human being himself, within his 
most inward soul" (p.30). Yet, we need to recognize that we cannot find the point of separation 
between decisions, because such a point would be based on a constructed framework to begin 
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with. In contrast, we'can sense we are near this point, not because it is a comforting feeling, but, 
on the contrary, because we momentarily feel unsettled. Awareness, then, becomes a process of 
thinking a way out of the feeling of being overwhelmed by first finding where and how we are 
situated vis-a-vis the problems at hand. This is a journey of self-discovery, where we begin to 
clarify to ourselves our many roles and the activities that encompass them. Hence, like a character 
in Conrad's Heart of Darkness, we must leave our made-up minds at the gates of civilization in 
order to make sense of what lies beyond common sense 
Somewhere along this journey we come upon the distinction between work activity and 
natural activity; where, for the purpose of this discussion, work results from a disruption to 
routines, the odd moments when we scramble to regain control over a situation. Consequently, 
experienced teachers and principals are less involved in this sense of work activity and tend to be 
more naturally active, most of their lives dwelling in that forgotten everydayness of being home 
at heart. Ironically, it is not in the temporary displaced state of work activity that authenticity is a 
possibility, because the fight or flight survival instinct consumes all our faculties, creating a sense 
of urgency; consequently, obscuring any meaningful appreciation of the situation at hand. In 
contrast, natural activity has the privilege of extra time, because we are in control, in the 
automatic/leisure state of routine. We are safe at home. However, home is also where we lose the 
sensing that accompanies new experience, and where we also stop thinking. The work, then -- the 
disruption -- becomq . . an attempt to think through our routines, presupposing that if we can think 
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ourselves back to awareness, we can begin to sense once again the authentic state of our daily 
activities. Yet, this process is always at risk of falling victim to the trappings of work activity 
which keep us pre-occupied, distracted from an authentic sense of being. It is important, here, to 
distinguish between an authentic sense of s d f  and an authentic sense of being, where the former 
attempts to answer the psychological question Who am I? while the latter attempts to answer the 
phenomenological question What am I doing? Thus, the genuine thinker walks a fine line along 
the threshold between being authentic and narcissistic. 
What can we gain by exploring the phenomenon of time in the process of making 
decisions? Schools, as in all human organizations, come to life through the process of making 
decisions, be it a student who chooses to behave in class, a teacher who chooses to start a study 
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group, or a principal,.who chooses to seek ways to raise extra funds. Yet, all these decisions must 
contend with time, and, on occasion. time itself becomes the deciding factor. Due to its finitude (a 
minute begins to diminish with every passing second), time becomes a driving force behind all 
school decisions. Yet, we intuitively feel short changed by time, cheated out of the full experience 
of school life. The ticking clock distracts the mind from appreciating the process of achieving 
understanding and the richness of decisions blossomed from a deep dialogue. For those are the 
moments that teachers call great lessons (and later feel guilty for having gone passed the assigned 
time). But what if we separate time from decision-making, and ask the question What does it look 
like to make decisio*? In order to achieve a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, we must 
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first begin by exploring the phenomenon of time itself. 
"Phenomenology," writes van Manen (1990), "is a human science.. . since the subject 
matter of phenomenological research is always the structures of meaning of the lived human 
world" (p. 1 1). This is to say, "phenomenology is the systematic attempt to uncover and describe 
the structures, the internal meaning structures, of lived experience" (van Manen, p. 10). The 
structures of lived experience can be "seen" as thematic, suggests van Manen: "when we analyze 
a phenomenon, we are trying to determine what the themes are" (van Manen, p.79). 
Subsequently, our understanding of the world in which we live is comprised of many themes; in 
reference to Schutz and Luckmann (1 973), van Manen writes, "each of us may be seen to inhabit 
different lifeworlds at different times of the day, such as the lived world of work and the lived 
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world of the home"'(jj. 10 1). For the purpose of research, van Manen identifies four hndamental 
themes, which he calls "existentials": spatiality or lived space, corporeality or lived body, 
temporality or lived time, and relationality or lived human relation (p. 10 1). He goes on to say that 
we experience life through these existentials in conscious and subconscious ways (van Manen, 
pp. 101-106). 
Current literature on the topic of lived time suggests that time is a concept with many 
meanings. Lightman's (1993) poetry expresses time as a metaphorical sense of being, 
condemning us to dimensional existences. Innis (195 1) suggests that time as a political construct 
has historically been used as a tool of control. Hargreaves (1994) argues that time as a social 
construct can be arranged according to political objectives, and goes on to suggest that time 
presents the possibility for opportunity. Ballard and Siebold (2000) point out in their study of 
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monochromatic and polychromatic work cultures that time as a cultural construct can have an 
effect on the manner in which we communicate with one another. Waldenfels (2000) suggests 
that time as a linguistic mechanism of self-reproduction allows us to continuously re-create a 
consistent sense of self in the world. Hodge (1999) argues that time as a multidimensional 
thinking process can explain how we move through the world, where there is a thinking of 
movement (time), a living through movement (temporality), and an expressing of movement 
(articulation). Mazis (2002) suggests that time as dance is a timing of one's movements to the 
movements of others-gnd to the movements of mother earth, a rhythm of living that has become 
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obscured in Western society, due to its culture of dominance. Gentner et al. (2002) point out in 
their experiment that time can be understood in terms of a space-time metaphor, where it is easier 
for us to refer to time as a space we pass through. Thompson and Bunderson (2001) propose that 
time can be explained as a metaphor of balance between the conflicting demands of work and 
non-work, which can be resolved through a creative balance that is consistent with one's core 
values. 
STEP 2 
WAITING FOR THE RIGHT TIME 
In the meantime let us try and converse calmly, 
since we are incapable of keeping silent. 
(Waiting For Godot, Estragon: Act 11) 
Poetic time 
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Alan Lightman's (1993) novel, Einstein S Dreams, provides a fascinating insight into the 
human consequences of time lived in its many dimensional realities. The novel itself is a play on 
time, taking place over a couple of hours, one day in late June, 1905 (the year Einstein published 
his theory of relativity); and, in the few hours it takes to read the novel, Lightman carries the 
reader from April 14 to June 28. Over these few months, the young Ph.D. student, Einstein, 
dreams of thirty possibilities of time. Each of these possibilities can be read as metaphorical 
expressions of temporality or, more precisely, of time's condemnations. 
Einstein's Dreams is a meditation on our condemned existence. Time is circular, 
condemning us to endless repetition. Time spirals back, like a flow of water, condemning us to 
fear present actions in order to not ill affect the hture. Time, like space, is multidimensional, 
condemning us to suffer three simultaneous outconles for every action. Time is both mechanical 
and of the body, condemning us to desperation when the two times meet. Time flows slower the 
further one is from the earth's centre, condemning us to living in the mountains. Time is absolute, 
condemning us to judge all actions according to the clock. Time erratically reverses cause and 
effect, condemning science to a foolish gamble of prediction. Time passes but little changes, 
condemning the ambitious to suffer "knowingly, but slowly." The end of time may free us from 
opportunism and guarded actions, but condemns us to the end of life. Time is a trap, condemning 
us to a lonely existence because the past cannot be shared. Time brings increasing order, 
condemning us to disorder as the only act of self-determination. Time stands still at its centre, 
condemning us to choose between living in a preferred frozen moment or taking our chances with 
the tragedies of moving time. Time is an image, condemning us to a collage of disconnected 
moments. Time has no memory, condemning us to record keeping. Time offers glimpses into the 
future, condemning us to unfinished projects as we continuously change to accommodate the 
future. Time passes slower the faster one moves. condemning us to keep moving. Time moves 
backward, condemning us to the past. Time is living for one day, condemning us to a crammed 
existence with little time to build relationships. Time is a sense, like sight or taste, condemning its 
appreciation to the beholder. Time is living forever, condemning us to suicide as the last act of 
self-determination. Time is a quality, condemning us to a consequential existence, where we must 
wait for events to trigger other events. Time has no future, condemning us to the present. Time is 
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a visible dimension,.,condemning us to escapism, as we stay in the present to escape an undesired 
future or rush to the future to escape the present. Time is disconnected with split second pauses as 
time moves passed the gaps between segments, condemning truth to mis-interpretation. Time is a 
temple, condemning us to worship our creation. Time is a local phenomenon, condemning us to 
isolation. Time is a predetermined future, condemning us to a passive existence. Time is infinite 
repetition, condemning us to repeated thoughts until we forget what we are thinking. Time is a 
shifting past, condemning us to an altered reality. Time is a creature to be caught, condemning us 
to chase after it. 
Arguably, Einstein's Dreams is a tragic story of time, Lightman's play on the old gypsy 
curse: "Be careful what you wish for. It might come true." Yet, within these temporal metaphors, 
time can be experieqce -. . at different levels. First, there is the realm of those who agonize over the 
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true nature of existence. These are the prophets of time who wrestle with their knowledge through 
sleepless nights, hide in the shadows, and whisper tortured sounds. Then, there is the realm of 
those who are a product of their time, either oblivious to the dimensionality of their own 
existence or afraid to tread beyond its boundaries. Finally, there is the realm of those who choose 
free will, who break the time rules, who do as they please because it pleases them to be free: 
'These adventuresome souls come down to the lower world ... lounge under the trees that grow in 
the valleys, swim leisurely in the lakes .... hardly look at their watches and....[w]hen the others rush 
by them and scoff, they just smile" (p.3 1). 
Political time 
Harold Innis (1 95 l), the Canadian economic historian, points out that from the early 
beginnings of recorded time empires have striven to control time by interpreting astrology and the 
seasons according to political ends. This is evident in the architecture of immortality of Egyptian 
pyramids or the accuracy of seasonal predictions of Babylonian astronomy. The politics of time is 
further exemplified by the introduction of the Julian calendar and, its later replacement, the 
Gregorian calendar. Striking examples can be found in Julius Caesar's establishment of January 
1st as the start of each new year, a date not implemented in England until 1752, or the 
establishment of year 1 A.D. based on the debatable work of Dionysius Exiguus, the sixth century 
Christian scholar. The rediscovery of mathematics by Renaissance Europeans, as a result of 
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Moorish Spain and Gther contacts with Eastern cultures, increased the measurability of time, 
enabling a more accurate prediction of given points in the future, a skill which greatly benefited 
commerce and the establishment of contractual agreements. Innis notes that the Renaissance 
replacement of the cyclical nature of medieval time with a linear concept of time paralleled the 
development of the faculty of history, a discipline which by the Enlightenment had effectively 
wrestled control of time away from the Church. As time control shifted from Church to State, 
nation building events came to replace those of a religious nature, evident in the move away from 
holy days to holidays, such as the national days of independence marking the birth of the newly 
formed nation-states. To this end, the technological revolution, especially in the area of 
communication, became the great weapon of the State, beginning with Luther's use of the 
printing press, culnihating i n  Hitler's use of the radio. Moreover, due to further advancements in 
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technology, especially in manufacturing and transportation, time control has shifted from State to 
Industry. Consequently, Innis concludes, immediacy has become the industrial nature of time, 
resulting in a disconnected sense of being, alienated from community and an earthly sense of 
nature (Innis, "A Plea for Time"). 
Socio-political time 
Hargreaves (1994) looks at the different dimensions of time and how they structure the 
working reality of teachers. First, there is "technical-rational time." Time is defined as a resource 
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to be manipulated or allocated, like any other resource, in order to achieve predetermined 
objectives. This is the objective time of scientific management. Second, there is "micropolitical 
time." Organizational time is not distributed equally but according to a hierarchy of importance. 
For example, the more important core subjects tend to receive more time than the less important 
electives. Similarly, high school teachers have historically received more preparation time than 
have their (less important) elementary school counterparts. What's more, moving into higher 
levels of administration is accompanied by more time away from "regular" teaching. 
Consequently, more time is given to those of greater importance in school organizations. Third, 
there is "phenomenological time." Individuals tend to internalize the passing of time differently, 
subjectively. This distinction can be found between teachers as well as between a school 
administration and its staff. Reasons for variations in living time are due to personal factors and 
the circumstances surrounding particular interactions. For example, in referring to Edward Hall's 
distinction of monochromatic and polychromatic time, Hargreaves notes that teaching is a 
polychromatic activity because it deals with many things at once and requires time flexibility to 
allow for learning readiness. In contrast, school administration is a monochromatic activity 
because it is chronologically oriented to dealing with one thing at a time and requires adherence 
to schedules in order to ensure the completion of tasks. Fourth, there is "sociopolitical time." 
Essentially, this is the big stick rule: the one with the biggest stick gets to allocate time. The 
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hierarchy of authority structures the trickle down power of time allocation, where government 
sets the time of districts, superintendents set the time of principals, principals set the time of 
teachers, and teachers set the time of students. Also, Hargreaves points out that the separation 
between teachers and administrators creates a different sensation of time, where, due to the 
distance away from the classroom, administrators may sense that matters are moving too slow 
and feel that they need to intensify implementation schedules; while, teachers, who are at the 
centre of the activity, sense that matters are moving too fast and feel that administrators are 
placing increasing pressure on them to perform. This intensification, Hargreaves suggests, is 
beginning to erode the separation between working time and personal (non-working) time. 
In 1989, Hargreaves and a colleague, Rouleen Wignall, conducted a qualitative study to 
test the ~ a r x i s ~ r i t f c a l  theory of inten.s$cation. Essentially, the theory states that teaching 
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practices are coming under an ever increase level of bureaucratic surveillance as school 
administrations place greater demands on teachers; effectively, replacing the humanness of 
teacher autonomy with a mechanized process of curriculum delivery that is standardized and 
compartmentalized. Hargreaves and Wignall specifically investigated the value of preparation 
time by interviewing teachers and principals of six schools, covering two school districts in 
southern Ontario. A common concern raised by teachers was that they felt they did not have 
enough time. As a result, teachers had to give of their personal time by coming early to work, 
staying later, andfor taking work home. Responses ranged from extra prep time being very 
valuable to concerns about being away from one's students. "The time and effort these teachers 
commit to their preparation and teaching," writes Hargreaves, "comes not so much from grudging 
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compliance with external demands as from dedication to doing a good job and providing effective 
care within a work context" (p. 127). Although personal responses varied as to the value of prep 
time, what becomes evident from the study is that the value of time is subjective and personal. As 
such, colleague collaboration becomes reduced to a contrived collegiality, because, as 
Hargreaves notes, collaboration can not be scheduled but happens naturally at different times of 
the working way. In essence, time can only offer opportunity but opportunity cannot be 
scheduled. 
Cultural time 
Ballard and Siebold (2000) conducted a study to identify the relationship between 
communication and different uses of work-time. They looked at two different working 
arrangements in a large American service company. The first working arrangement comprised of 
hourly-wage or salary employees, while the second working arrangement consisted of project- 
base performance. The first group operated in a very structured work environment, while the 
second group operated in a more open-ended environment in order to deal with variations from 
one project to another. 
The researchers based their study on previous findings (Conrad, 1990; Latane, 1996; 
Blyton, Hassard, Hill, & Starkey, 1989; Glennie & Thrift, 1996; Zerubavel, 1981; Ditton, 1979; 
Cavendish, 1982; Hassard, 1989; Starkey, 1989) which suggest that time is a cultural construct, 
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where culture itself is a "communicative creation;" this is to say, culture can be understood (Hall, 
1976; Schein, 1992) as a management of symbols (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). For example, as 
some studies (Gersick, 1988; McGrath, 1991) demonstrate, when a deadline is established in the 
completion of a task and as the deadline approaches, group interaction becomes increasingly 
restricted, producing "particular symbolic behaviors," such as strained interpersonal 
communication (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). Moreover, Edward Hall (1959,1966,1976,1983) has 
distinguished the use of time between monochronism (i.e., clock-time) and polychronism (i.e., 
natural-time), where the former is concerned with deadlines and time as a limited resource, while 
the latter is concerned with allowing a task to dictate its own completion schedule and allow for 
frequent interruptions that result from personal relationships. Hall's distinctions have been the 
focus of much research .. (Bluedorn, Kaufinan, & Lane, 1992; Kaufinan, Lane, & Lindquist, 1991; 
1, , 
Limaye & Victor, 1991; Schein, 1992) on the concept of time as a social construct (Ballard and 
Siebold, 2000). 
In their study, Ballard and Siebold (2000) further distinguish Hall's concepts by 
identifying time in terms of tangibility, involvement, and scheduling. According to previous 
research (Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Hall, 1966, 1976; Clark, 1985; Graham, 1981) the 
tangibility of time differs between monochronism (e.g., time is fixed, linear, and quantifiable) and 
polychronism (e.g., .,,, time is fluid, dynamic, and cyclical). Furthermore, research (Hall, 1959, 
1966, 1976, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1987, 1990; Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Bluedorn, 1998; Clark, 
1985; Hassard, 1996; Limaye & Victor, 1991; McGnth, 1988; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath 
& Rotchford, 1983; Schein, 1992; Graham, 1981) suggests that the involvement required of time 
can differ between monochronism (e.g., compartmentalization, a dislike of interruptions, and 
private-ownership) and polychronism (e.g., open work area, interruptions and borrowing and 
lending). In addition, scheduling also differs between monochronism (e.g., a desire to control 
time, and a rigid adherence to schedules) and polychronism (e.g., schedules are tentative and 
plans can change easily and often) (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). 
The study by Ballard and Siebold (2000) found that the office staff (i.e., hourly wage, 
salary) functioned according to the findings of previous research on monochronism, while the 
I . .  , 
hnctioning of field &fT(i.e., project-based) was consistent with previous findings on 
polychronism. In addition, the communicative environment of the monochronistic group 
alternated between organizational and interpersonal concerns, while the polychronistic group 
limited its communication to task-specific concerns. Another finding of the study was that the 
polychronistic group had developed a much faster feedback loop, when compared to that of the 
monochronistic group. The researchers suggest that this can be explained by the need of the field 
staff to continuously check on their hourly and daily goals in order to maintain a planned 
production schedule. By comparison, the office staff did not have the same sense of immediacy 
and tended to receive its feedback in the form of reports, consequently having to wait much 
longer than the field staff for feedback. 
As a result, the researchers suggest that a person's awareness of time boundaries, made 
explicit through the length of feedback loops, structures work group communication where time 
itself is defined according to monochronistic or polychronistic expectations. "Communication and 
time are reciprocally related," they write, "[because] ... different coordination requirements involve 
different kinds of communication. These coordination differences constitute, and give rise to, 
unique temporal cultures" (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). Subsequently, they point out that this 
relationship is supported by previous findings (Dubinskas, 1988; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967; Cusella, 1987; Gersick, 1988, 1989, 199 1; Jaques's, 1982; McGrath and 
I, , 
Rotchford, 1983; Hassard, 1991). 
Linguistic time 
Waldenfels (2000), the German phenomenologist, argues that the relationship between 
time and language is formed by the reality that present mindedness is an expression of 
afterthoughts about what has already occurred. "We are never entirely at the top of time;" he 
explains, "rather we arrive upon the scene a little late, and our speech reverberates against us like 
an echo of ourselves." In other words, we are always lagging behind time. As such, expression is 
based on re-collection of events, where the hyphenation makes explicit a going back with the 
intention of holding together a unity of intuitively juxtaposed signs, brought to our awareness 
through the senses, signifying the corporeality of lived experience; hence, a moving from the 
,,, , 
physical world to the perceptual mind and back to physical existence as an expression-in-the- 
flesh of our present state of being. 
"All in all," concludes Waldenfels, "we live temporally, just as we exist in the flesh." 
Here, Waldenfels borrows Merleau-Ponty's notion that to exist means to exist in the flesh. 
Metaphorically, to live is to hit the world like a piece of raw meat slapped on a wooden table, 
seasoning as it absorbs the residues. Subsequently, our experiences marinate our flesh. Thus, we 
reek of the world-in-which-we-live. Moreover, language becomes a mechanism by which to give 
back to the world a:&e of who we are. 
It is only when we try to speak (i.e., superficially record) that we come to reflect on who 
we think we are, and begin to recognize that we are re-creations of ourselves. In this context, to 
speak about time is to express a particular recollection (worldview) about our place in the world. 
Here, Waldenfels makes a distinction between a classical idea of order (i.e., we passively witness 
the passing of natural time) and a radical idea of beingness (i.e., time is a human construction to 
explain experience). In the latter, time, as temporal experience, becomes a recollection, a 
reconstruction, a self-referencing, a self-reproduction: "as consciousness of time and time of 
consciousness in Husserl; as being and time as well as time and being in Heidegger; as flesh of 
time and time of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty; as time of the other and alterity of time in Levinas 
and Derrida; as time of narrative and narrated time in Ricour." Incidentally, Waldenfels points 
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out, physical science'itself, through Einstein's theory of relativity, has come to replace fixed time 
with moving time. The implication is that time becomes a superstructure, a hegemonic function 
of a self-justifying and self-reproducing meaning system. 
To speak of time as a meaning system enables phenomenology to flush out lived 
experiences from memory, presupposing, as Husserl suggests, that events occur at a zero point 
not marked by time, because once an event has occurred one can only return to it in thought and 
expression. For Husserl, memory cannot be commanded, Waldenfels explains; we cannot order 
ourselves to remember, but, in a self-reproducing manner, to remember requires an awareness of 
experience so that we may reprise to hold or stop that which has already occurred. (By 
implication, to forget is to have not been completely aware of the event.) "Accordingly, time lag 
means that speaking-begins somewhere else, in the realm of a pre-language, a pre-predicative, a 
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pre-discursive realm.. . . Language.. . .precedes itself and oversteps itself, because in this sense it 
has itself a flesh and does not just speak about the flesh." For example, the incarnation of 
experience can be witnessed through the cry of pain or pleasure-- sound that is not yet speech-- 
hinting at meaning in a form of expression that comes close to Wittgenstein's silent passing. 
Perception, anchored in the flesh through the senses, is self movement: "In looking, listening, 
feeling, tasting, or sniffing," writes Waldenfels, "my flesh responds to that which comes to the 
fore, occurs to me, surprises me and affects me in the flesh. In perception the world is staged and 
not simply registered in its details." 
Time as multidimensional thought 
Joanna Hodge (1999), the British phenomenologist, works through the process of 
thinking about time as it is presented in Martin Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time (Sein 
und Zeit). Hodge brings to surface the challenges that arise from the process of thinking when 
attempting to articulate what is "time." Heidegger, she notes, places a door in front of us in the 
form of a question: 
What could lie beyond the horizon of the ordinary conception of time? 
To enter this door, to take up Heidegger's challenge, places extraordinary demands on the 
mind. It is an exhaustive exercise, one that I would equal to a sensation of standing on the ledge 
of a high rise building combined with the anxiety of attempting to capture one magnet with the 
aid of another. As such, Hodge's essay is a difficult read in as much as it requires much mental 
energy to sustain the many dimensions at play in Heidegger's discussion on time. Essentially, 
Hodge presents her Qwn arguement for what she thinks occurs when we think about time. To 
speak of time, she suggests, is to articulate the experience of "movement." For to live is to move 
through the world physically (sensing) and mentally (thinking). One dimension of living in time 
is a movement between everydayness (normality) and an "ecstatic inhabitation" 
(removedlabstract contemplation); a second dimension is a movement between being "ontically 
engaged" and having an "ontologically analytical understanding" of living-time, whereby the 
former is a physical unity of experience and the latter is the objectification of such experience, a 
separation of time as object of study from the oneness of its ontical unity; a third dimension is a 
movement between the "obscured" ungraspability of ontical unity as it forms everyday existence 
and "illuminated" ecstatic thoughthlness as it forms an ontological analytical understanding of 
temporality (living-time). Although the mind cannot separate these dimensional movements, she 
goes on to say, it also cannot experience them simultaneously. This is the ontological reality. 
Consequently, Hodge asks "how are they [dimensions], and the relations between them, to be 
thought?" For the problem lies in the thought that to think about thinking is an abstraction of an 
abstraction, where the intentionality of thought conceals, obscures, the temporality of time as an 
ontic lived experience. In essence, we forget ourselves as we become immersed in thought and 
remain unaware of a passing through the "unthought," from where arises articulated signification. 
In this way, to live as a moving through the world places us in three realms: "time" as a thinking 
of movement, "temporality" as a living through movement, and "articulation" as a possibility of 
. . 
expressing movemeit. Nonetheless, Hodge points out, by the very nature of the limitations of 
thinking, a true grasping of the ontical unity of experience will forever elude us. As such, we are 
destined to fall back into the structure of our thoughts, grounded by the same gravity that sustains 
the momentum of our momentary flights away from common sense: 
Only if the human is presumed to remain still does the horizon [of meaning] also 
remain stable and unproblematically provide a framework within which to locate 
observables. Once the human position is put into motion, the horizon becomes 
also a moving point of reference. The difficulty is that the horizon has ceased to 
be a system of mobile orientation points and has become simply a visual 
metaphor derived from a residual human experience of country living, in terms of 
which a sense of distance and relation in human experience had been grounded. 
Nevertheless, as thinking beings we strive to understand, where understanding results from an 
"oscillation" between the different dimensions of temporal awareness. Hodge further clarifies that 
oscillation occurs as.a result of the "repetition" of time as the object of time is reintroduced at 
each level of thought; "[olne of the most basic structures of temporality for Heidegger ... is this 
structure of repetition where the analysis is carried through in order to reveal that another level of 
analysis is available and necessary in order for the first level to make sense." Nonetheless, the 
nearest we can come to "original" experience as it occurs in the "immediate now," and as a series 
of "nows" constituting a living-in-the-world, is "authenticity," an ecstatic thoughtfulness which 
can reveal but not replicate the everyday-taken-for-granted-ontical-unity-of-being-in-the-world. 
Nevertheless, authenticity is made possible by the oscillation through the repetitiveness of time as 
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an ontologically analytical understanding, where "[tlhese ecstasies are brought together and held 
together momentarily in the instant of self-constituting self-affirmation ... which has the temporal 
structure of the instant of transformation." Incidentally, it is this falling back into the originating 
structure of thought that fornls an additional dimensionality of time, historicity. This dimension 
makes evident that apresent can only be understood as apas t  in a j d u r e .  Thus, the 
phenomenological concern is not what is the narrative of past events (history) but how do we 
interpret the hermeneutics (signification) of our situated existence (historicity). Hence, the multi- 
dimensionality of movement can be expressed as direction (time), repetition (temporal), 
oscillation (ecstatic), and historicity (grounding). Hodge further explains that the dimensions of 
direction, repetition, and oscillation are relatively stable, but the dimension of historicity is 
9. 
unstable due to it situatedness, its facticity. In this way, phenomenology accepts its own 
limitations, its reductions, its restrictions on understanding. For phenomenology, as presented in 
Being and Time, can only take us so far. Hence, what lies beyond the horizon of the ordinary 
conception of time is structured by the intentionality of those who attempt to articulate the ontical 
unity of movement, of living in time. Thus, intentionality becomes self-affirmation. Essentially, 
Hodge presents us with a positioning of the phenomenology of Being and Time as a mode of 
thinking that recognizes the ~nisguidings of Icarus' flight into poststructuralism, on one hand, and 
the trappings of Daedalus' structuralist prison, on the other. 
Dancing time 
Mazis (2002) suggests that, as modem beings, we feel we are constantly running out of 
time because we have become disconnected from our living world. As a result of science and 
imperialism, which have guided Western thinking for the past five hundred years, time has been 
constructed within a binary relationship of control versus helplessness. As such, we have 
divorced ourselves from time as a process of nature, where the modem understanding of nature 
becomes one of a resource to be exploited and consumed. Yet, due to this separation, time moves 
independent of us; q d ,  as such, we have become helpless against the natural phenomenon of 
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time. Thus, the modirn person exasperates "I have no time!" The logic of our common sense has 
placed us in a devil's fork, forever trapped in a dimension whose circular argument of 
past/present/fbture prevents us from thinking past the rationality of a chronological, lineal, 
existence, and reduces all speaking to a matter of pace (e.g., movement that is too fast, too slow, 
or just right). This line of reasoning, Mazis argues, is grounded on an adversarial relationship 
with mother earth, where every step becomes a fight against gravity. Ironically, as our planet 
spins around the sun, the possibility to stand still is created. Our moving world creates the gravity 
that makes us feel safe, protected, and reassured that we are on solid ground. However, modern 
thinking prevents a reconciliation between gravity and movement. Consequently, the modern 
being remains alienated from one's own moving world. We think that we move independently of 
the earth we walk o&And, as such, we find ourselves in a race against time; but, because we are 
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helpless and cannot control time, we are forever falling behind. We can never cheat time and get 
ahead of it. 
In opposition to this understanding of time, Mazis presents another possibility, one that is 
much older and has been with us the longest, and continues to be practiced, to varying degrees, 
around the world: time as a dance of earthbodies. By earthbodies Mazis suggests that we are all 
connected in a communal sense. Consequently, we become whole when we synchronize our 
movements to the rhythms of our living world. In this way, we enter a communal existence by 
timing our movemerits, like a child internalizing the rhythm of a skipping rope rhyme, and, when 
. . 
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the timing is right, joins in. Thus, movement becomes timing, and timing becomes connected 
existence, and connected existence becomes the moment lived. We become living time. In 
contrast to this understanding stands the modern being, out of time, in a struggle for survival to 
avoid collisions with untimely occurrences. 'What we haven't allowed ourselves to see," writes 
Mazis, "is that if the timings are poor, then the speed, the cruelty, and the relentless pressure of 
time's flow increases. We don't see this because we don't want to see our responsibility for this-- 
as if time has its own speed apart from any human participation" (p.37). Time that lacks timing 
makes us feel uneasy. What is telling about this, Mazis suggests, is that movement is a felt 
experience and timing, as a shared existence, is e-motional -- a shared feeling of communal 
forward movement. Yet, to enter the dance requires a commitment, void of personal gain and 
1.. . 
power relations, to share, care, and "become touched by those to whom we are relating" (p. 180). 
Ego-moving time 
Gentner et al. (2002) conducted a study to identify the effects of language to understand 
time. The researchers performed three different experiments centred around the making of 
temporal inferences based on spatial metaphors. In their study, they focused on two different 
ways to speak about time: the ego-moving and the time-moving metaphors (p.537). In the ego- 
moving metaphor, a persodobserver situates oneself in relationship to the event. For example, in 
the statement "I will arrive in Toronto tomorrow" the "Ilobserver" can be situated as follows: 
'past--I--Toronto--future'; subsequently, the "I" (i.e., ego) speaks about itself as moving through 
time toward the event. By comparison. in the time-moving metaphor, the observer situates oneself 
q.. . 
in relationship to two events. For example, in the statement "The sun rises in Toronto before it 
does in Vancouver" the persodobserver making the statement can situate oneself in any number 
of ways: 'past--I--Vancouver--Toronto-- future'; or 'past--Vancouver--I--Toronto--fUture'; or 
'past--Vancouver--Toronto--1--future'; subsequently, the observer speaks about oneself in terms 
of being outside the time constraint that forms the temporal relationship between two events 
(Gentner et al., p.559). 
"The abstract domain of time," note the researchers, "... can be organised and structured 
in terms of the more,familiar and readily observable domain of space"(Gentner et al., 2002, 
1. . 
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p.539). However, there can be varying reasons for the use of space-time structures to express 
temporal experiences. Gentner et a1 point to research (Fauconnier, 1990; Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Turner, 1987) which suggests that time receives its structure by being 
metaphorically mapped according to the tangible experiences of space; or (Murphy, 1996) 
perhaps time and space have inherent structural similarities allowing these two independent 
systems to be conceptually aligned and use linguistic expressions interchangeably; or (Gentner, 
1983,2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995; Gentner, 
Falkenhainer, & Skorstad, 1988; Keane & Bradshaw, 1988; Forbus, Ferguson, & Gentner, 1994; 
Gentner & Wolff, 2000; Wolff & Gentner, 2000) at a more intentional level metaphors or 
analogies are formed by finding and building on commonality between the structures of time and 
space, allowing infeknces # I \  to be made based on the grounding system of space when expressing 
the orbiting abstraction of time (p.557-58). 
The implication is that metaphorical speech requires consistency between the referential 
domains (e.g., time and space) (Gentner et al, 2002, p.543). For exaniple, time as a sequential 
experience (Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978) can be expressed in spatial terms of aheadhehind rather 
than rightllefi (Gentner et al, 2002, p.538). The findings of the study note that when presented 
with mixed metaphors (e.g., time is rightllefi) the speed of processing information was reduced, 
compared to when the metaphors were consistent (e.g., time is aheadhehind). Moreover, the open 
endedness of the time-moving metaphor also slowed down the processing time to express 
temporal experience, with subjects opting, instead, to express themselves using the ego-moving 
metaphor (Gentner et al, 2002, p. 559-560). Moreover, the researchers point out that studies 
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(Fraser, 1987; Alverson, 1994; Lakoff et al.) on the use of time metaphors have revealed a 
number of ways time is perceived (Gentner et al, 2002, p. 560). 
Balanced time 
Thompson and Bunderson (200 l), the American organizational theorists, argue that the 
tension between conflicting time demands, which arise out of a work-nonwork dichotomy, can be 
mediated through a metaphor of balance. By balance the authors suggest that as long as work and 
nonwork demands arc "consistent in terms of core values [individuals] may achieve balance by 
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focusing on what is central to their identity in each domain" (p.35). Thompson and Bunderson 
(2001) base their argument on the premise (Frankl, 1985) that life becomes tangible in terms of 
its meaningjdness rather than as a measurement of quantifiable units of time (p.2 1). As such, the 
nature of living in terms of its meaningfdness lends itself to a metaphorical approach to 
understand personal purpose. Moreover, Thompson and Bunderson (2001) point out that research 
(Burke et al., 1979; Judge et al., 1994; Keith &Schafer, 1980; Pleck et al., 1980) demonstrates 
that temporal requirements of work and nonwork domains result in conflict (p.19-20). Also, 
research (Higgins, 1987, 1989; Higgins, Klein, &Straman, 1985) demonstrates that conflict 
arises from the distinction between 'who we think we are' and 'who we think we should be' 
(Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.27). Yet, as cognitive dissonance suggests (Festinger, 1957), 
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desires of dissatisfaichon and frustration are accompanied by desires for conflict resolution 
(Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.27). Subsequently, emotional considerations establish the 
criteria to differentiate between quality time and quantity time, fbrther giving credence to a 
metaphorical approach to capture an imagery of the temporal nature of lived experience 
(Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.20). The authors do recognize, however, that this "meaning- 
based conflict" may be more apparent in certain social-structural systems (i.e., occupations, 
industries, or at different levels of a hierarchy) (p.26). Nonetheless, they argue that although 
conflict may be negative (Deutsch, 1973; Katz and Kahn, 1978), research (Thoits, 1987; Kelly 
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and Kelly, 1994) demonstrates that conflict presents opportunities for resolution by finding 
shared meaning between multiple roles (Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.24). "Underlying this 
boundary condition is the assumption that some level of conflict is actually beneficial in the 
creation of meaning. It is only when we are forced to make difficult choices that we have the 
opportunity to define ourselves and thus to develop an identity that can be afirmed"(Thompson 
and Bunderson, 2001 ,p.26). 
STEP 3 
I. 
THE MOMENT BETWEEN BREATHS 
Vladimir: Let's wait and see what he says. 
Estragon: Who? 
Vladimir: Godot. 
Estragon: Good idea. 
Vladimir: Let's wait till we know exactly how we stand. 
(Waiting For Godot, : Act I) 
A method to a madness 
Max van Manen (1990) refers to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, the German 
hermeneuticist, to distinguish between "human" and "natural" science. Generally, natural science 
studies "objects of nature," "things," "natural events," and "the way that objects behave." In 
contrast, human science studies the "person;" this is to say, "beings who have 'consciousness7 
and who 'act purpos&illy' in and on the world by creating objects of 'meaning7 that are 
'expressions' of how human beings exist in the world" (van Manen, p. 3-4). Van Manen makes a 
hrther distinction whereby, on one hand, the application of natural scientific principles to social 
science has resulted in experimentation and quantitative analysis with the aim to taxonomize 
behaviour and offer explanations on the basis of probability; as such, behavioural social science 
becomes a mechanism for effective management or control of human behaviour (van Manen, 
p.4 -2 1). On the other hand, the human science that has become the work of Nietzsche, Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, is an attempt to understand what it means to be 
human: the phenomenon of humanness. The starting point of phenomenology as human science, 
argues van Manen, is a recognition that human beings are.free, and as free beings we move 
through the world experiencing it along the way. As a result, phenomenology is the work of 
4. 
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connecting humanity to its world experiences, of having a clearer understanding of how we exist 
in the world. This premise of freedom, van Manen goes on to point out, places phenomenological 
study at odds with the premiss of control found in behavioural social science (p.21). In addition, 
phenomenology can be distinguished from other social science disciplines in that it does not work 
to explain cultures (ethnography), social groups (sociology), epochs (history), the human mind 
(psychology), or personal histories (biography) (van Manen, p.11); nor is phenomenology a 
literary work or an artistic endeavor, because literature and art can be representational, 
interpretive, or ficti$ial. "If there is one word that most aptly characterizes phenomenology 
itself," writes van Manen, "then this word is 'thoughtfUlness"' (p.12). Here, van Manen turns to 
Heidegger in explaining thoughtfidness as "a heeding," "a caring attunement," of what it means 
to live life (p. 12). But in order to give consideration to a thing such a thing must first present 
itself in the mind. Consequently, a phenomenologist can only be thoughtful about that which is 
already conscious in the human mind. "Consciousness is the only access human beings have to 
the world .... it is by virtue of being conscious that we are already related to the world. Thus all we 
can ever know must present itself to consciousness" (van Manen, P.9). 
Phenomenology is the study of lived experience. But what is meant by lived experience? 
According to Dilthey, van Manen notes, experience can be understood in two ways. Initially, we 
encounter the world through our senses; the things we see, feel, hear, taste, and smell. Later, we 
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think about the thin& that have presented themselves in our minds through the senses. This later 
process of thinking transforms things into objects (van Manen, p.35). Incidentally, it is the 
objectification of experience that forms the mindset of mainstream observers of the world, who 
through reasoning separate object from subject. Consequently, it is the objectification of lived 
experience from which phenomenology strives to keep away. "[Wle should try to resist the 
temptation to develop positivistic schemata, paradigms, models, or other categorical abstractions 
of knowledge" (van Manen, p.46). Hence, this is the dilemma of phenomenological 
understanding: at the moment of experience the experience becomes a thinhng back to what has 
just occurred. We can even go as far as to say that by virtue of the momentary delay in sensory 
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perception, our present can only be composed of past moments. Therefore, if we can only 
experience past acts, a deja vlc reality, then are we not always at best capable of reflecting on 
what has just occurred? What's more, is reflection not a thinbng of the world we have 
encountered through our senses, hence the danger of objectification? The answer to this is 'yes.' 
But phenomenological reflection draws on the reflexive faculties of the mind. Reflexive 
reflection is an awareness of being aware. For example, when a presenter becomes aware that the 
audience is looking at him, the presenter becomes uncomfortable, displaced from his 
presentation. But as he becomes involved with his presentation, and forgets about the audience, 
he feels more at ease, nat~trally unified as a presenter-presenting (van Manen, p. 35-36). In other 
words, to speak of li?cd experience is always a thinbng back, yet this thinbng back can be 
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distinguished between recollection, reflection. and reflexivity; whereby, to recollect is to think 
back to the event (e.g., 'I did a presentation'), to reflect is to think back to the feelings of the 
event (e.g., 'I felt uncomfortable when I noticed the audience looking at me'), and to be reflexive 
is to think back to the awareness of how one felt (e.g., 'I know the moment when I forgot about 
the audience'). This "past presence" of lived experience suggests a temporality to our beingness 
(van Manen, p.36). But does reflexive reflection not require an awareness of displacement to 
begin with? What if a person is lost in routine, immersed in one's own natural unity as doer- 
doing, can one phenomenologically study such an experience? The answer to this problem is a 
qualified 'yes'. The qualification is based on the type of research questions one is asking. 
Phenomenological questions aim to make possible an understanding of "what it is like" 
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to act in the world h a  particular way (van Manen, p.44): What is it like to be a teacher? What is 
it like to be a principal? What is it like to be a student? As such, phenomenological questioning 
requires one to be conscious of lived experience in order to be thoughtjitlly reflective. 
(Nonetheless, there is a research method known as ethnomethodology which strives to reveal the 
characteristics of doing what the doer may not be conscious of.) Phenomenological inquiry is a 
"living" questioning, whereby the questioner "becomes" the question, an interrogation "from the 
heart of our existence;" to paraphrase Husserl, "to question something by going back again and 
again to the things themselves until that which is put to question begins to reveal something of its 
essential nature" (v4- ane en, p.43) It is the essential nature of things that is the heart of 
phenomenological questioning. The essence of lived experience is that which distinguishes one 
experience from another: for example, how is being a teacher a dflerent feel from being a 
principal? How is the world experienced through the senses different from teacher to principal? 
This is to say, the essential nature of a lived experience is the existence of the characteristics that 
orient the person to the experience: the doer to the doing: for example, how does being a principal 
look different from being a teacher? 
Here, we come upon the accomplice of questioning - the retelling of the experience. The 
phenomenological observer, as sihmtedperson, is intersubjective in one's retelling. This is to say, 
the writer requires the reader to "validate" the described phenomenon (van Manen, p. 11). In this , 
way, a phenomenologically written work is a "living" document: "the researcherlwriter must 
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'pull' the reader inti'the question in such a way that the reader cannot help but wonder about the 
nature of the phenomenon in the way that the human scientist does" (van Manen, p.44). Thus, 
phenomenological writing is a retelling of discovery. If there is a method that can be ascribed to 
phenomenology it would have to be its "presuppositionless" (van Manen, p.29). Consequently, 
phenomenology can be distinguished from grounded theory, ethnography, and content analysis to 
the extent that these approaches employ methods to categorize and code data so as to reveal the 
characteristics of the topic of study (van Manen, p.29). 
How can phenonlenology contribute in a meaningful way to the study of human 
experience? This question has two parts: first, can it contribute to society in any meaningful 
way?; second, are its findings accurate, or, at best, mere generalizations that shed little light on 
understanding h~mafrex~eriences or, at worst, imaginative interpretations that bare little 
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resemblance to the phenomenon of study? It can be said that phenomenology is part of an ancient 
preoccupation with the search for the true connection between mankind and the things of the 
world, mediated through lived experience. Van Manen notes Nietzsche's reference to Diogenes, 
the fourth century B.C. Greek philosopher, who used a lantern in broad daylight to search for 
"real human beings" (van Manen, p.5). This is to say, phenomenology is the present 
manifestation, among other human sciences, of a concern with the alienation of human beingness, 
which has plagued humanity throughout its documented history of thinking. Subsequently, as a 
process of helping US. to understand ourselves, in a way that stands opposite to the removed 
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positioning of the positivistic scientist (natural or social), phenomenology can contribute in a 
meaningful way by making us aware of how we have interacted with others, in the hopes that we 
can become more attentive about our interactions in future. This does not mean that 
phenomenology aims to predict future behaviour, but that it aims to place the mind of the doer in 
a more connected state with one's doings. It is a way by which to make us aware of the routines 
in our lives; where, some routines are good and these can be better appreciated, while other 
routines may need to be altered and for these the hypnotic state of their beingness or common 
senseness needs to be bought to surface. Consequently, by raising our behaviour to 
consciousness, this human science can be a catalyst for change. Moreover, for phenomenology to 
be effective it must accurately capture in language a description that "reawakens or shows us the 
1. 
lived quality and significance of the experience in a fuller or deeper manner" (van Manen, p. 10). 
In this way, phenomenology can avoid falling into the realm of interpretive endeavors, where, as 
critics can point out, one interpretation is as good as the next; since such endeavors are inaccurate 
to begin with and, as such, can lead to erroneous conclusions and poor decision-making. 
Metaehoricallv the phenomenon seeaks 
In every scieutific endeavor, at some point, ink must be put to paper. Yet the manner in 
which this is done differs according to scientific method. As already mentioned, 
phenomenological hermeneutics can be distinguished from other sciences because of its intention 
not to structuralize experience. So, when van Manen writes that the "aim of phenomenology is to 
transform lived experience into a textual expression of its essence" (p.36), he is telling us that the 
work is to flush out from words a deep understanding, a gut-feeling, of an event one has lived 
through. In this way, phenomenological writing is an exercise in hermeneutics and semiotics. 
Hermeneutics transforms writing into a dialogue between writer and reader; consequently, the 
text becomes a living document. In essence, a phenomenological work is apersonal giving of 
oneselfto be shared between writer and reader. Moreover, semiotics allows the writer to make 
explicit the symbolic interaction of experience by providing the writing tools to bridge ontology 
with etymology in forming the epistemology of phenomenological hermeneutics. Thus, as van 
Manen states, in reference to Sartre, "Writing is the method" (p. 126). What's more, this method 
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is not a removed act like a clinical procedure in a sterilized sensory deprivation room; on the 
contrary, it is an immersion like listening to a tango in a smoky bar, thick with life living. 
Phenomenological hermeneutics is a conversation, and as such it is composed of both what is 
made explicit through what is said and what is implied in what is left unsaid. It is a poetic story 
telling. "Poetizing," explains van Manen in reference to Merleau-Ponty, "is thinking on original 
experience and is thus speaking in a more primal sense.. ..a language that sings the world.. . .a 
primal incarnation ... which harkens back to the silence from which the words emanate" (p. 13). 
Thus, metaphorically the phenomenologist speaks. For the metaphor has the power to move us 
past the tangible limitation of words and bring us to where thinking speaks through silence -- the 
Nietzschean origin of meaning and Virginia Woolf s poetic transcendence (van Manen, p.49). 
Coffman mh;~blem (1987) conducted a study to identify the effectiveness of metaphors 
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as a managerial tool to motivate subordinates. The researchers interviewed three top managers, 
each in charge of a major division of the city government of a Northwest county, in the United 
States. The researchers based their study on previous findings (Pfeffer, 1978, 198 1; Weick, 1978; 
Norton, 1977, 1978; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Smircich, 1983; Eisenberg, 1984; Pacanowski 
and O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1983; Manning. 1979; Koch and Deetz, 1981; Bormann, 1983; Smith 
and Simmons, 1983; Barley, 1983; Riley, 1983) which seem to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
metaphors to construct organizational culture (p. 53-54). Also, research (Ortony, 1975, 1979; 
Pavio and Begg, 19&1; Samples, 1976; Branham, 1980; Broms and Gahmberg, 1983) appears to 
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demonstrate the effectiveness of metaphors in developing unspoken motivational language in 
organizations (p.56-57). The study by Coffman and Eblem (1987) found that their research tends 
to support previous findings. The study demonstrates that metaphors vary from manager to 
manager and from situation to situation. The reasons for this, the researchers suggest, could be 
due to individual differences in figurative language which arise out of different organizational 
cultures, subcultures, and countercultures, as well as the language skills of managers which 
results in varying degrees of metaphorical imagery and intensity (p. 61-62). As such, the study of 
metaphors may help to uncover the symbolic hnction of language in developing mutual 
interpretations of organizational experiences by group members (p.53). 
Morgan (1997) argues that metaphors are inherently paradoxical, because, on the one 
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hand, they show us'a'particular way of seeing, yet, on the other hand, they blind us to other ways 
of seeing (p.5). As Morgan points out, "[tlhink 'structures' and you'll see structures. Think 
'culture,' and you'll see all kinds of cultural dimensions" (p.349). Yet, metaphors need to make 
sense within the environment they are used: "Scientists have generated powerfLl insights by 
studying light as a wave or a particle. But not as a grapefruit!" (p.350) While metaphors enable us 
to creatively problem solve, they do have their limitations. As Morgan, so pointedly puts it, to 
speak of 'a man as a lion' may give us a deeper appreciations of such qualities as bravery and 
strength, but a man is not a lion; what's more, to think of man as a lion prevents us from thinking 
about him as a pig, a devil, or a saint (p.4). The practical value of metaphors is in their ability to 
move passed an impasse. " An understanding of the unconscious psychic traps that are holding an1 
organization in an undesirable 'attractor pattern' can provide the all-important breakthrough for 
"I 
generating new opportunities around organizational learning" (p. 353). Morgan suggest that there 
is not one metaphor that can provide a solution to organizational management and leadership, but 
rather the challenge becomes one of developing the skills to be able to use the appropriate 
metaphor for a given situation (p.348). The reason for this is because in a given day there are a 
multitude of dimensions manifesting themselves at the same time, each requiring a different 
approach, whereby an organization can be seen as machines, organisms, self-organizing brains, 
cultural communities, political systems, psychic prisms, ever changing systems, and systems of 
domination (p.349). , 
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The method of analysis I use in this thesis is both phenomenological and metaphorical. A 
phenomenological approach has allowed me to meditated on the phenomenon of decision-making 
relative to time (and its temporal awareness). Thus, I have returned to the question What it is like 
to make decisions? over and over again in an attempt to reveal something of its essence. In 
addition, metaphors have enabled me to draw a mental picture of constructed ideas about time 
(and the temporal situatedness of decision-making). Through a combination of these two methods 
of analysis it has been my intention to produce a hermeneutical work that raises to awareness the 
intellectual pause, thus constructing a point of reference for deep dialogue. 
STEP 4 
HERE IS NOW, NOT AS A REMEMBERED MOMENT, 
BUT AS A FELT HEART BEAT, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER, 
AND THEN ANOTHER 
We are no longer alone, waiting for the night, waiting for Godot, 
waiting for . . . waiting. All evening we have struggled, unassisted. 
Now it's over. It's already tomorrow. 
q.. . 
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(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act 11) 
What does it look like to make decisions? 
The reviewed literature attempts to construct mental images of time and temporality. Yet, 
these images have little in common other than attempting to address the phenomenon of 
movement. This becomes evident when attempting to speak about time in a temporal sense or 
vise versa. It is as if trying to square a circle or round a square. Time is a discourse of controlling 
movement, while temporality is a discourse of appreciating movement. As such, time is 
adversarial, a struggle between those who want to control time and those who already control it. 
In contrast, temporality is self-awareness, a rehabilitation from the addiction to time: awareness 
of its nature, recognition of its effects, a change in behaviour. Time and temporal discourses can 
only interpret criticq~2malysis of their own existence in these respective terms. Consequently, the 
followers of time feel that temporal discourse is a waste of time, while those who espouse a 
temporal sensibility feel that time discourse is narrow minded. Unfortunately, organizations are 
products of both time and ten~porality, a reality from which decision-making in schools cannot 
escape. 
Coming to the essence of making decision is a journey of self-discovery, where we begin 
to clarify, to ourselves, our many roles and the activities that encompass them, so that we may 
develop a deeper appreciation for the ways we think, speak and experience schools. On this 
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journey we travel alone with only our thoughts for companionship. It is a poetic dwelling that 
reveals our being-in-the-world: for, as Heidegger suggests, "[tlhe poetic is the basic capacity for 
human dwelling" (p.228). Hence, let us begin our journey with an image of a maze. We can 
neither enter nor leave this mental construct, because we are always within the maze of decision- 
making. Its presence is revealed to us through the poetic language of metaphors. Thus, on our 
journey toward the essence to making decisions, we create the possibility to acquire a glimpse of 
what can be thought to be the many manifestations of the decision-maker (relative to time and its 
temporal awareness). 
Being Contractual 
To begin to ynderstand how time affects decision making, we need to first understand the 
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story of time itself. Time is as old as the first contract. It was present on the day we formed the 
first covenant with the gods of the ancient world. Since that fatehl day, documented human 
history has been comprised of contractual obligations. The contract is, perhaps, one of the most 
hndamental social mechanisms outlining human interaction. Within the life of a contractual 
agreement the terms between affected parties are spelled out. Contracts range from unspoken 
understandings between comrades to the written constitutions that guide the operation of all 
organizations, great and small. It is even rumored by UFO enthusiasts that the Eisenhower 
Administration entered into a contractual agreement with little gray aliens. As out of this world as 
this example seems, it lays testimony to the coiitractual phenomenon. Consequently, the time- 
contract phenomenon has formed the chronological history of civilization, dating from the Epic of 
Gilgamesh to the m&lern atomic clock synchronized to neutron stars. Yet, there has also been 
another tradition, one that is much older than time. This tradition dates back to the birth of human 
consciousness, to a period when human beings lived with nature, before history, before the needs 
to feed and propagate were replaced by the desires to accumulate wealth and enslave. This out of 
time existence depended primarily on being attentive to the immediate present. It was a physical 
existence of touching, smelling, tasting, looking, and listening. It was a pre-domination existence 
that had not yet discovered the most powefil subjugating weapon ever known to mankind -- the 
spoken word. Although in modern terms we speak of such an existence as prehistoric or 
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primitive, mankind'hk, since recorded history, contemplated a return to a natural existence. The 
modem word for this nostalgic phenomenon is the phenomenological concept of temporality. Yet, 
even temporal discourse is structurally grounded, tethering around the time-contract phenomenon 
which rules our Global Village, from the sky scrapers of Kuala Lumpur to the Inuit of Labrador 
It is within these two traditions that we exist, albeit uneasily. 
Time is a word of domination. What is common about human constructs like the word 
time is that they are tools of ownership and control. For example, the farmer names his crops and 
the hunter names his prey because they form the means of survival. Similarly, the priest names 
the seasons and the politician names the holidays because they form the means of continuity 
Essentially, naming is the act of giving value to things, but a value based on a power relationship 
where the one who.mn~es has power of meaning over the thing named. Hence, what cannot be 
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named has no meaningful value. For power over things is the legacy of human beings. In the 
modern world, the scientist names the numbers and the industrialist names the work because they 
form the rules of predictability. 
Thus, the poetry of the contractual being is numerical: 
2, 3, 5, and 7: 
Prime are these numbers, 
For they cannot be composed of more than two factors. 
Time is an entity onto itself. It is a self re-creating eco-system. Time is autopoetic, 
hegemonic, paradigmatic. Time is a marble, a self contained thought. There is only one way to 
speak about time, in terms of domination. This is the time of Innis' history, Lightman's time 
1. . 
subordinates, Hargreaves' opportunities, Ballard and Siebold work cultures, Waldenfels 
linguistics, Gentner et al.'s ego-moving-time, Thompson and Bunderson's balance, and the 
education crisis of government commissions. 
To exist in time means to exist within a paradox. Time is both empowering and 
enslaving. On the one hand, there are the masters of time and, on the other hand, in opposition, 
there are the slaves of time. Militarily, the colonization of Africa can arguably be said to have 
come about as a result of the synchronized British firing line, while the liberation of South Africa 
came as a result of the unpredictability of the guerrilla tactics of the Boers. Similarly, the duration 
of modem employd&t is established as a result of contract negotiations, while workers' rights 
are won as a result of labour disruptions. In this sense, 
Time 
Is a struggle. 
It is the standardized 
Assembly line versus the individually 
Crafted masterpiece. Time is mortgaging the future 
Versus living within one's means in the present. Similarly, 
Time is standardized testing versus learning readiness. It is the 
Savings of part-time instructors versus the consistency of full-time teachers. 
Beinn Reflective 
If decision-making is a game of chance, rather than choice, then its real value rests in not 
knowing the outcome, for the gamble is to win against the odds of unpredictability. As such, 
making decisions be6omes a coin toss with the treasures of its outcomes buried deep in decisions 
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up in the air; and, in a race against the gravity of time, gamblers rush to place their bets. 
Against these odds, awareness is suspended in the anti-gravity of temporality. The 
temporal being is Zarathustn's superman in flight, a manifestation of the Nietzchean Affirmation. 
Temporal existence is self-awareness, a rehabilitation from the addiction to time. It is a returning 
to the corporeality of one's ontic unity to the living world (but not through a transcendence to a 
mirrored representation of one's selfi for this risks becoming trapped in the narcissism of self- 
absorbed thoughts). Temporality is an act of self-determination, a protest against Milton's fallen 
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humanity, weighed sown by the sin of corruption, condemned to wait for the end of time. It is the 
here and now. Temporality embraces the endless possibilities of the will to live. It is Nelson 
Mandela deciding to walk into prison rather than obey the guards' orders to run! 
Thus, the poetry of the reflective being mocks the finitude of reductionism with the fallen 
8 of infinity (invisible but forever present): 
Temporality is a word of personal reflection. It is an attempt to understand the personal 
effects of our scheduled realities. Temporality is an appreciation of our movements through the 
many time-systems that encompass our daily living. It is an exercise in breaking the bonds of 
history, obligation and naturalness which obscure the distinction between the roles we play within 
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time-systems and a sense of self, independent of these roles. This is the temporality of Hodge's 
cognitive movements and Mazis' dance. Temporal discourse strives to divorce the person from 
the authoritative nature of time which grounds existence with obligations: 
I 
Am 
A parent, dinner is 
At seven; I am a teacher, 
The test is on the eleventh; 
I am a principal, I had to 
Cancel dinner due to a 
Meeting with a parent; 
I am a student, I 
Missed my test 
Because I 
Overslept. 
4. . 
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Time and temporality form opposite sides of the same coin. They are action and thought 
in the dialectical motion ofjustification, criticism, and reaction. Consequently, time is 
continuously changing, from the ancients who acted as expected (e.g., the fall harvest, the spring 
sowing) to the industrialist revolutionaries who expected action (e.g., late means one minute past 
the starting hour according to the factory clock) to the post-industrialist anarchists whose actions 
are independent of expectations (e.g., deadlines are societal expectations, only humans are 
rushed). 
Thus, the p&ry of the critical being is a constant reminder that logic is exactly the 
product of a working definition, such as the number 1 which is neither prime nor composite, but a 
defining factor: 
Presently, we find ourselves at the crossroads of existence. As earthly beings, for 
thousands of years, we have synchronized our existence to earthly cycles and rhythms; as 
technological beings, most notably in the past fifty years, we have synchronized our existence to 
the ever increasing speed of computers. In a world where technology exists for technology's sake, 
evident in the scientific race for artificial intelligence and self-repairing microchips, there is a 
growing human uneasiness, a frightening realization that we are becoming slaves to our own 
creation, and, perhi& one day, may become obsolete altogether! If in the past fifty years we 
have moved from propeller planes to unmanned supersonic flying machines, only imagination 
can limit technological advancements over the next fifty years. Consequently, as an earthly 
human reaction to the technological phenomenon, we are rediscovering our ancient ways. 
We have forgotten how to remember, argues Casey (1987). The Greek goddess, 
Mnemosyne, and the oral tradition of recounting have been replaced by the computer and the 
modern practice of retrieving stored data. Yet, a computer cannot remember, because 
remembering is the calling forth of a wisdom built on experience, where experience is an 
interpretative human process. "The mathematization of nature," explains Casey, "so prominent in 
Galileo and Newton as well as in Leibniz meant that memory, too, would eventually become 
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mathematized" (p. 16). Consequently, we have become a forgetful culture in the pursuit for 
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immediate gratification. We have surrendered our memories to computers and the media, 
allowing us to elude responsibility for past actions with the ever present possibility of starting 
afresh. "The result of this basic action is a re-presentation that, in claiming to possess likeness to 
an original presentation, offers no unification of its own, no gathering together that is binding on 
its own terms" (p.293). Against this alienated existence, Casey calls for a reclaiming of our 
memories. We must have the freedom to remember, to say, "these memories are mine" (p.290). 
Genuine remembering empowers us with self-determination, the capacity for true choices. It 
returns us to the autknticity . , of being-in-the-world. Genuine remembering is bi-directional, past 
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and future, a difference united in the sameness of the self in the present: 
It does this by selecting, emphasizing, collocating--sometimes condensing and 
sometimes expanding--and in general regrouping and reconfigurating what I have 
experienced so as to allow a more coherent sense of self to emerge.. . .At the same 
time.. . .what I now remember myself to have been is by no means a fixed affair. 
It is once more a matter of freedom.. . .realized through assessing my own past as 
a prologue for my own future--an assessment carried out on the basis of values I 
am maintaining in the present (p.29 1-92). 
Ironically, although we tend to hold (modern) scientific thinking in higher regard to 
(ancient) non-scientific beliefs, modern science has forgotten its own epistemological 
superstructure. According to Walker (1990), ancient scientlJic beliefs were founded on the 
mystical value of numbers. From the pyramids to the cosmos, the ancient world was steeped in 
numerology. One ofithe most influential of these thinkers was Pythagoras, the 6th century B.C. 
", 1 
Greek founder of the music of the spheres. Pythagorean proportionalism divided all things within 
the tetractys, the boundary of the universe expressed numerically as 10. The number 10 was the 
sum of the numbers 1, 2 and 3, representing the beginning, middle and end of all things, as well 
as the number 4, representing the four comers of the earth and the sum of the beginning (1) and 
end (3). In addition, ancient astronomers believed that the universe consisted of nine planetary 
bodies, including earth, but according to Pythagorean beliefs there was a tenth planet hidden 
behind the sun. Moreover, Pythagoras observed that all movements on earth created sounds by 
vibrations; accordingly, the movements of the planets also created sounds. Yet these planetary 
sounds where not audible to the human ear, because the divine numerical relationships that kept 
the planets from falling also kept the purest form of music, the music of the spheres, beyond the 
human sensory realm, and could only be understood intellectually. Walker explains that the 
Pythagorean musical scale, common to the ancients, was based on a "rising cycle of natural 
fifths," where, expressed in modem notation, the cycle begins with "middle C," for which there is 
a zero value of distance, and progresses twelve steps as the scale moves full circle. Pythagorean 
harmonics remained the dominant Western musical theory until its decline in the Renaissance. 
Nonetheless, Pythagoras has left us with the ancient scientific belief that all natural things are 
interconnected--a truth invisible only to the limited mind, awaiting discovery by the human 
intellect (Walker, 19,990, +.. Ch. 3). 
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Being Imaginative 
Perhaps, in the end, the journey to understand the relativity of time (and its temporal 
awareness) to decision-making has come full circle. Although the means of human expression 
have changed from pre-historic cave drawings to e-mails, the innate human capacity which has 
driven us from cave dwellers to space travelers is, and has always been, imagination. Thus, we 
have returned to where we begun, the human mind. It is the imaginative mind that first enabled us 
to express past events, such as a caveman's successful hunt, and later depict future events, such as 
Da Vinci's flying machines. Imagination allowed the ancient Sumerians to invent the wheel, the 
Greeks to develop the concept of the sphere, Copernicus to speculate that the earth circled the ,, 
sun, and Hubble to map 3.. . our spiral galaxy. This creative capacity has permitted the observable 
"I. 
world to be thought of in abstract terms, in order to hypothesize ways of understanding such 
phenomena as Sumerian transportation, Greek aesthetics, Renaissance astronomy, and a modern 
sense of positioning. We are able to visualize abstract ideas through mental images. As such, the 
0 or zero came to represent the Indian concept of quantifiable nothingness, 7T or Pi came to 
represent the ratio between the circumference and diameter of a circle, came to represent 
infinity, and Alpha and nmega came to represent the beginning and end of a sequence. 
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Thus, the p&try of the imaginative being begins with a zero moment, the entrance to a 
logical sequence, a nothingness to which one can never return (other than as an irreproducible 
reconstruction): 
Similarly, one can expressed time and temporality in visual forms. Time can be seen as 
lineal, paralleling the lineal nature of political logical thought, where the ones who hold political 
power determine the logical sequence of things, and suppress ideas that counter the dominant 
logic of the time. Consequently, time architecture symbolically represents the rulers through a 
series of connecting points, such as the triangles of ancient pyramids or the rectangles of modem 
corporate sky scrapers. Time structures are top down, hierarchical, compartmentalized, where 
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increases in power parallel increases in the geometry of extra time and space. For rulers are never 
rushed and have the more spacious offices. The time being is a bureaucrat, never wanting to feel 
late. In contrast, temporality can be seen as circular, following the circular nature of earthly 
cycles, where the changing seasons and periods of the day determine the rhythmic pattern of 
things, yet where nature's rules can be cruel and unforgiving. Consequently, temporal 
architecture is constructed from one's natural surroundings through an intertwining and weaving 
of local resources, such as the Inuit igloo or the jungle huts of the indigenous peoples of the 
world. Temporal structures are communal. open, where shared responsibility forms a wholeness, 
a connection outside constructed time and real estate. Villages have no doors. The temporal being 
is an artist, always wanting to siesta at the beach and, with closed eyes, feel the warmth of the 
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afternoon sun. No h n d e r  the timely teacher is forever frustrated with her temporal students. 
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Periodically, both wanting to be someplace else. 
Being Trapped 
The thought of escape makes evident one's sense of imprisonment. To be trapped 
suggests that all possible options have been exhausted. One can no longer make decisions in 
one's best interest. The prisoner is at the mercy of the jailer. Freedom can only be attained 
through a violent act or an act of violation, a rebellion to break free from the control of one's 
captor. These are the -. flights . of fancy of the future jailbird, the striking worker, the revolutionary 
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colonist, the rebellious child, the truant student, the disenchanted teacher. Unfortunately, escapees 
are condemned to a life on the lamb, hunted, untrusting, fearfbl of being exposed, of being 
caught, living in a lie. In the end, the escapee realizes that freedom on the run is an incarceration 
worse than the prison from which one escaped. This is the epiphany of the escape artist. Freedom 
is a state of being. Better a lamb at the altar than a lamb on the run. Consequently, the jailbird 
commits suicide, the striking worker quits, the revolutionary becomes a martyr, the child runs 
away, the student drops out, and the teacher no longer volunteers. For a k te  worse than death is 
submission to the rule of the authority one is rebelling against. 
Thus, the poetry of the trapped being is always boxed in: 
Figure I 
Yet, to be trapped is itself a mental construct. But it is a realization revealed to a 
condemned few: the artists, poets, prophets, and the insane. These are the cosmonauts whose lives 
are a journey along the event horizon. Periodically, they disappear and find themselves in a 
fantastic world where paintings come to life, words are suspended in mid air, hture events are 
revealed, and voices have no bodies. In our world, these multidimensional beings move in quirky 
motions and do peculiar things: they dance at hnerals and laugh in libraries. Some are plain 
crazy, while others are ahead of their time. But none belong to the present. They are the blind 
ones who realize a truth which eludes those who can see, that the limbs of an elephant are not 
independent of each other but parts of a whole living being. Yet, this is not an absolute truth, but 
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a matter of choice. For there are no right answers, only choices. The distinction between being 
lost and on a journey of discovery is a state of mind, an opinion, a matter of choice. 
Being Choices 
Can everything be a matter of choice? Is everything as relative as time? Is it a lie to state 
that "the sum of two plus two is four"? How much of what we tell ourselves is the truth? Is the 
tooth fairy real? How about Santa Clause? or Are these rites of passage, coping mechanisms, 
security blankets? Is it accurate to say that once we grow up we no longer believe in fantasies? Is 
Evolution a figment of our imagination? Are space aliens real? Is the Big Bang a big illusion? 
Are crop circles a hoax? Could it be that reality is merely a product of a collective consciousness, 
a mutual agreement? Can we really determine, for example, if someone is fit to stand trial, aren't 
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all murderers insane?' Are soldiers sane? What is the difference between a freedom fighter and a 
terrorist? What is the difference between a student who performs at 85% and one who performs at 
86%? How exact is the concept of loo%, when, for instance, due to advances in measurement 
technology, today an athlete can win a race by a fraction of a second, when not long ago the same 
race would have resulted in a tie? How accurate is accuracy? Are numbers absolute or are they a 
form o f j a t  currency, where their value is based on mutual consensus? Would it not be more 
accurate to state that a number attains its value by virtue of what it is not; for instance, since the 
number four is not &jive or a three, then is it most probable that the quantifiable entity which lies 
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between three and five is four? But, again, perhaps as a result of further advances in radical 
mathematics and theoretical physics we may stumble upon an entity other than four? (Only time 
will tell.) Are reality, truths and lies, then, nothing more than reductions, products of a fabricated 
lineal existence, a making of a circle into a straight line by segmenting its circumference into a 
sequence of beginnings and endings? Would it not be more honest to recognize that there is no 
starting point other than our own imposed beginning? (After all, the great promise of reductionist 
science as the logical replacement to philosophy came to an abrupt end with Max Planck's 
pronouncement that at the root of all matter there is nothing except motion.) 
Thus, the poetry of the choosing being is unorthodox: 
Figure 2 
If life is a matter of choices, then how can we determine what are good decisions? This 
question might be clearer if turned it on its head: What bad decisions have we made as a 
dominant or, more precisely, dominating species? Were we wrong to have burned Joanne of 
Arch, or send the Newfoundland Regiment to slaughter in the Great War, or hlsely imprison 
Rubin "Hurricane" Carter? What these historic events have in common is that each was the result 
1. . 
of a particular logic:'a process of thinking which concluded that such decisions served the greater 
good. Although, today, we can pass negative judgement on them, we can also understand how 
such decisions made sense within the context of their time. Yet, to say that hind sight is 20120 
condemns us to repeat the arrogance of the past: the belief that the present is immune from 
mistakes. Only the future will determine which of our present decisions are short-sighted, blinded 
by the times in which we live. In other words, decisions are acts which direct our movements 
through the multitude of problems we face. 
Being Ahistorical 
Which is the right decision? The truth is that we don't really know. We can only trust our 
instincts, our sense of positioning, our point of reference. For only later can we discover if we 
4.. 
made the wrong tur6: No wonder governments have laws to delay public access to government 
decisions well past the retirement, if not the life, of the decision makers. But does this mean that 
we are condemned to a game of Ru.ssian Roulette, where most decisions are bound to be the 
wrong ones? If today's right decision becomes tomorrow's wrong decision, does this imply that 
our present will move in the future, where the past is to be found in a different position from the 
present? Stated differently, the present is comprised of a particular logic, founded on a history 
that places sign posts which mark the boundaries of a present state of mind. These boundaries 
allow us to make certain decisions. For instance, a teacher may feel compelled to contact the local 
child protection agency concerning a young student who comes to school with bruises and 
displays behaviour consistent with abuse. But later it is discovered that the child is a victim of ' 
school bullying. In retrospect, it may be found that in the absence of clear protocols the school 
made the wrong decision by assuming that the parents were at fault. In other words, if clear 
protocols were in place then the teacher might have followed a different course of action-- she 
may have made different decisions. Through this example we can see how the future can have a 
past comprised of more than one present, the present of wrong decisions and the present of right 
decisions. But if the present, as a future concept, is not fixed, does this also suggest that the 
present itself is moving? How fixed is the present? or, asked differently, How is the present 
fixed? On what grounds do we make decisions? Can we reduce the present to a Shakespearean 
play with each even&lready written simply waiting to be acted out, including the conclusion? 
Are we trapped within our own lineal sequence, a timely beginning with a predestined end, where 
decisions are self-preserving of one's position and of the system itself? Little wonder 
postmortems are littered with statements like "I had no choice. I was caught between a rock and a 
hard place. And given the same circumstances I would probably make the same decision again." 
But if the past (as a fbture concept of the present) has many possibilities, then, as forward moving 
beings, we can never return to the same place once an event has entered the threshold of the past. 
Thus, the poetry of the ahistorical being has many returns: 
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Beinn Words 
Is it all just a play on words? Are we serving a self-composed life sentence, living a series 
of stories, independent of one another, magically linked through the use of conjunctions, creating 
the sensation of interconnectedness? (Is it coincidence--when feeling the pressure of time--we 
become impatient and want others to be economical, to spell things out, to quickly get to the 
point.) Perhaps, existence is a movement through a series of com(m)as, with periods of 
displacements, deja-vus, that tease the mind (reminding us of a self-composed stated reality, 
bracketed in forgetfulness). Thus, a novice poet becomes overwhelmed, anxious, agonizes over 
the realization that words and all thoughts contained within them are like clay with the possibility 
of endless formations: "I can give mankind wings and turn civilization into a flock of birds!" 
exclaims a young poet. 
Meanwhile, the cruel honesty of a weathered poet stems from having known for quite 
some time that the clay of words is all we have: "I will flush life down the toilet," threatens an old 
poet, as he dangles all meaning over the sewer; "Then what will you have?" he taunts his 
homfied audience, who in self-interest is paralyzed by the thought of loosing everything they 
value. In the absence of an answer, the poet breaks the unnerving silence by screaming 'You will 
",, 
have NOTHING!" and begins a game of ini mini miny mo by tossing meaning from one hand to 
the other, like a ball of clay; all the while, his audience nervously watches and hopes the poet will 
not stop singing or have meaning slip away. 
Thus, the poetry of the wordy being is cyclical, always returning to the familiarity of a 
point already made: 
0 L 
Figure 4 
So, what is the point? Is it just a question of being witty, of knowing how to play with 
words, play with meaning, play with minds. Is theory itself nothing more than an intellectual 
bone we throw ourselves to keep preoccupied, to keep from looking passed the reflections of our 
glass houses, from realizing that we are the masters of our own enslavement--blinded by the 
glitter of the fools gold of coined expressions. Foolish is the orator who dwells in the security of 
pockets stuffed with nothingness to the point of tearing the seams, for when such a person needs 
to pay attention, even the possibility of nothingness has sipped away like sand under the feet. Can 
anything escape the gravitational pull of this black hole? Is paradigm discourse nothing more than 
a dog chasing its tail or, perhaps, a tail chasing its dog? Round and round we go, where it stops 
nobody knows. a 
Well, to entertain the thought for a moment, let's stop .... Oh, but we can't .... Why? ... 
Because life cannot stop, just like the world cannot stop spinning, nor the galaxy stop spiraling, 
nor the universe stop expanding. In essence, all we really are is movement. We move to fetch 
water, to get food, to lock the door at night, to open the window in the morning, to take a breath 
of fresh air. We move. From Nietszche to Heidegger to Derrida we move through our birth, death 
and rebirth. 
Being Movement 
We are movement. Everything else is meaning. This truth unravels truth itself. It is like a 
humed man quickly walking to a very important appointment. This man is too preoccupied with 
the events that are to,transpire at the meeting to notice that a fly has decided to join him. Without 
thinking or missing a step, he tries to shoo it away with one hand, to no avail. Eventually, he is 
bugged to the point that he stops in order to deal with this annoyance. But at the very moment he 
stops moving, so does everything else. And, to his horror, the world around him begins to feel the 
effects of gravity. First, the fly drops, then the birds, then the sky itself. In a panic, he runs. But as 
he runs, to his surprise, the world starts to pick up speed. Yet, the faster he runs, the faster the 
world moves. Now, the fly is flying at supersonic speed. Upon realizing how his movements 
affect the world around him, he slows down to a walking pace. But now he is attentive to his 
immediate present, savoring in delight at every step he takes. One block he walks slower, the 
next, a little faster, all the while, watching in disbelief at a world that is synchronized to his own 
movements. Sudden!-y, he realizes that the fly has disappeared. And in looking for the 
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whereabouts of his little companion, he inadvertently takes his attention away from the road 
ahead. As he traces back his steps, he notices that the sky darkens like a coming storm. When he 
turns to look forward again, he almost falls into a precipice. He is standing at the edge of the 
world. But as he takes a step forward, to his amazement, the ground forms beneath him. And, as 
he looks into the distance, he sees the world unfolding as far as the eye can see. But, now, he is 
paralyzed by the thought that the ground beneath his feet is as solid as his imagination. He must 
now concentrate, and not allow himself to be distracted. And, no matter what, he cannot imagine 
an ocean, because hk;cannot swim. Only in sleep is he out of danger, because when lost in the 
I. I 
world of dreams, one is not conscious of one's free fall through the nothingness of space. 
Thus, the poetry of the moving being is forever making connections: 
Thus, the poetry of the moving being is forever making connections: 
Figure 5 
We are kept from falling into the black hole of meaninglessness by a lifeline of emotions 
or intelligible feelings, tethering around the paradoxical truth of a movement-meaning continuum; 
Yet this truth is not a sun to be observe, because. at best, it is an educated guess of what lies at the 
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heart of our existence. It is an imagined truth. For that is all truth has ever been, imagined. To 
suggest that we can reach this truth is nothing more than a transcendental illusion: "Don't think 
too much or in time you will come to believe your own thoughts." Hence, the truth seeker is 
forever anxious, always wanting to get to the point, like a passenger on a sinking ship, 
strategically attempting to move to safety by letting go of one handle and grabbing hold of 
another. But the truth is that the passenger will be forever attempting to reach safety on a ship that 
is eternally sinking. Eventually, the wise seeker is bound to realize that to be sinking is nothing 
more than a sensatiop. This is the moment of acceptance. It is okay to let go. 
Being; Mindful 
Does this suggest that our discourse on time and decision making has been reduced to a 
well worn cliche about mind over matter? Perhaps we have entered the final stage of our 
evolutionary process, and, like a fish out of water, we are now jolted by a suffocating truth: that 
we have long surpassed our corporeality; hence, the present preoccupation with a return to the 
flesh, from sex in the media to suicide bombers. The twenty-first century being has become a 
mind stringing along its body. (Perhaps, there is more to string theorists than just a bunch of 
space cowboys playing with dimensional knots.) Since time is a state of mind, temporality is a 
thoughtful attending to a life physically lived within thoughts framed in time. We are tourists 
visiting Rome. ArtisJs .. .admiring our own art. But in time we become bored, impatiently polite 
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with repetition. Yet, before a sense of wasted time overwhelms us, like a child anxious to go 
some place else, the situated question abruptly presents it self "Why am I here right now?" 
(instantly, replaced by the assertion "I don't want to be here right now!"). Thus, killing time is an 
out of body experience. We have become a mindful beingness wrapped in a body suit of flesh. 
Yet, like an overqualified employee, we must humbly accept the ironic truth, that the brain 
becomes a mind only by absorbing the energy that flesh consumes from the outside world. (But 
only ethics and subsequent scientific restrictions will secure a monopoly of the flesh over the 
mind. For the brain: -,I, b a y  protect the flesh by telling the body to escape danger, but the mind will 
risk body and limb to achieve an intended end.) 
In the zero gravity of nothingness, the suspended mind awaits movement. 
Thus, the poetry of the mindfbl being is a maze with many entrances: 
Figure 6 
Being Obligated 
Why do we move? Throughout the course of a lifetime, we move through various 
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arrangements whick'form the basis of our contractual obligations. These obligations range in 
nature from the contractual agreements of Platonic republicans to those of Rousseaunean noble 
savages. Whatever their nature, these obligations frame the rules and expectations of behaviour. 
And, since time forms the basis of the contractual nature of human interaction, as movers we are 
constantly moving in.and .,, 1 out of time-zones. Yet, while these time zones are as independent of 
each other as the contractual arrangements themselves, it is difficult to distinguish when one has 
moved from one time system to another. Although it is like moving through a series of water 
walls, imagine these walls existing under the ocean. As a result, we tend to feel that we are 
simultaneously within all our contractual obligations. While in body we can only be in one place 
at any given time, in mind we can be everywhere else. Because of the overlapping illusion of 
contractual systems, we sometimes find it difficult to distinguish exactly which obligations we 
are trying to meet, giving credence to the expression "killing two birds with one stone." 
Nonetheless, our obligations shape our movements. 
Thus, the poetry of the obligated being is a guided motion: 
Beinn Thoughtful 
Movement has a shape. It comprises both the geometry of time and temporality. 
Movement is both lineal and circular. But its appreciation (for that is all that there can be, an 
appreciation, nothing more) requires a knowing that only a patient questioning can bring to light. 
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On the one hand, mhement is as lineal as a number series. For numbers are a trick of the mind, a 
way for the human intellect to make tangible the feeling that a decision needs to be made. It is at 
this sensational moment when we objectify our existence, and imagine ourselves as separate 
beings from obstacles themselves. (We are anxious beings because obstacles are comprised of 
particular logical sequences with their own time requirements.) On the other hand, movement is 
as circular as a spiraling galaxy. For such cosmic bodies are a visual reminder of the cyclical 
nature of the interconnectedness of gravitational movement. Circular shapes signal a returning. 
They remind us of something important, something we must not forget, like a string tied to a 
finger. Reminders become a constant nag on the stability of lineal thought. It is with nagging 
curiosity, then, that we come to discover how a particular logic has boxed us in. And faster than 
we can say "~=mc~>uch a logical box becomes an archeological artifact, evidence of a past 
mode of thinking. This process of manifesting our feelings into tangible entities enables the 
thinking being to move past obstacles. 
Thus, the poetry of the thoughtful being questions the direction of logical thinking: 
Figure 8 
Being the Beinnness of Unfolding Action 
Time (and ifk-temporal awareness) ceases to be a question of when and begins to be a 
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question of where. For we move by making the decisions that allow us to check where we are in 
relation to a mental map that is itself constantly shifting, as each passing moment becomes a 
series of possible presents conceived in a future already always at hand, but only becoming 
evident the moment we commit to a particular history. Hence, to command "I want to move" is 
human arrogance, since we are always in motion. To commit to a particular direction, therefore, 
will inevitable get us lost, condemning us to aimlessly wander in wonder through the wilderness 
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of self-constructed realities, falsely reassuring ourselves by constructing buildings and projects of 
the mind. For we are in movement, not the other way around. 
A genuine thinking about time requires a deep appreciation for the incomprehensibility of 
movement. To pursue the root of movement can only lead to constructed origins. But to become 
aware of our situated existence gives us a genuine speaking that reveals our in-movement through 
unpredictable momentary disruptions. We cannot see ourselves in-movement any more than we 
can look at ourselves by stepping out of our bodies. But we can feel that we are in-movement. 
This can be accomplished through meaningfbl play. For instance, if we were to speak of temporal 
awareness as an awareness of the Spanish word temporal (meaning storm), then to metaphorically 
see the essence of movement would be like looking at the eye of the storm. Yet this is not a 
'8.. 
sustained seeing, but.a glimpse caught as one momentarily awakens from one's eternal free fall 
through space. 
Thus, the poetry of the decision-maker (who aware of one's beingness as a mover- 
moving-in-endless-motion) is attentive to the silent passing of the momentum of unfolding 
action: 
7.. 
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STEP 5 
TO BE LOST IS THE FIRST HORROR OF MATURATION 
'I. 
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The spiralinSi maze of decision-making returns us to the moment before time becomes a 
factor. It reminds us that present decisions compose a range of possible pasts and futures. Since 
we can only bring forward a range of re-constructions of a given past event (revealing the pre- 
conception of pre-destination), we are bound to accept responsibility for what we are about to do. 
Thus, we are able to ask the Where questions that direct us to do the right thing, as opposed to the 
When questions that ensure we do the thing right. If we accept the image of decision-making as a 
spiraling maze, then to sustain this image gives us pause to consider what we are about to do. A 
visual metaphor is about looking, about appreciating perspective: to ask, If the moving maze of 
decision-making spirals in opposite direction to our Milky Way, then perhaps we should look at 
our galaxy from a different point of view? (For, when seen from above, our galaxy spirals clock- 
wise, but, when seerffrom below, it spirals in the opposite direction.) 
As decision-makers we are movers-moving-in-endless-motion. Consequently, we can 
never be outside movement, because even when we think we are standing still the world is 
passing us by. To stop moving is not a true choice, but an illusion of one. We cannot even find 
comfort in searching for what lies beyond movement. For to think of a beyond is itself a 
fabricated edge in the darkness of one's mind, which can only be sustained as a unrecognizable 
moment one repeatedly tries to return to, but must settle (if one is to settle at all) with a symbolic 
definition. And, perhaps, this is where the problem lies, in the institutionalization of the lie, a 
lifetime of looking the other way, securing one's self in excuses and explanations. Lies buy us 
time, so that we can pass the time as cautious pensioners with memory banks saving just enough 
avoidances to keep us distracted until death. We live in the forgotten fear of looking at a world 
'1. 
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that is in reality spiraling out of control. But to be out of control is not what really scares us. What 
we truly fear is the revelation that we do not want to let go. For ownership is our gravity. 
In the heart of the darkness of time is movement. We come to appreciate movement much 
like Pythagoreans came to appreciate the music of the spheres, as an interconnectedness revealing 
itself through the human intellect. For motion is invisible. To be-in-motion is to be a fish-in- 
water, naturally forgotten. Its existence is revealed to us through the possibility of the pause. The 
pause is not a stopping but a moment of realization. For instance, it is the moment when a soldier 
realizes he has caught a live grenade, or a victim of a con-artist who realizes he has been duped, 
or a tourist whose instincts tell him not to go down a dark alley, or a student who expresses "Oh, I 
get it," when he grasps a concept, or a friend who accepts another's decision, or an educator who 
catches himself forgetting that a troublesome student is a human being. The pause is the zero 
moment, the entrance to a logical sequence, because it reveals to us the intent of our actions, of 
what we are about to do. The pause disrupts the plan. It is a thinking that returns us to an 
awareness that we cannot control movement any more than we can stop the earth from spinning. 
In the pause we step out of (constructed) time, passing it like an automobile accident on 
the side of the road. Yet, this is a momentary passing, similar to how a song that skips makes us 
aware that we are listening to music or an abrupt end makes us aware we are living in a time 
commitment. Nonetheless, a pause cannot be sustained, for this would be stopping, and, as such, 
an illusion. But by remembering our pauses we are able to develop an appreciation for the 
authenticity of decision-making. Through this genuine remembering, crisis gives way to critique, 
and, with it, the possibility for creative decision-making. 
As a mover-moving-in-never-endless-motion, the decision-maker comes to appreciate 
that all one can ever be is situated in a temporary situation--realizing that we are never fixed but 
fixed in thought. To see decision-making as a spiraling maze, requires that we look passed the 
reflections of our glass houses. If there is an aesthetics to this metaphorical depiction of 'what it 
looks like to make decisions', then let it be one that jolts us, a braking of silence. If looking at the 
spiraling maze of decision-making gives us pause, let it be a pause that enables us to bracket 
common sense within, the invisible but ever present, zero moment, at one end of a logical 
sequence, and the fallen eight of infinity, at the other; hence, overthrowing the historic 
omnipotence of Alpha and Omega, along with their good intentions which pave the road to hell 
and back. 
At the conclusion of this briefjourney we come to discover that we are where we have 
always been: in the right her and now. But, now, in returning to our commitments and made-up 
minds, we remember our feelings of crisis, frustration and being overwhelmed with the wisdom 
of knowing that we are capable of achieving momentary peace of mind through the creativity that 
arises out of the dy&mics of opposition. Yet, this requires an awareness of our movements: 
knowing how our decisions direct us in juxtaposition to others. We come to know that we are in 
movement through a genuine attentiveness to how we come to and are with one another. To truly 
awaken to another human being is a felt experience, yet one that needs to be made intelligible 
through the language of emotions. Henceforth, if there is a way through the spiraling maze of 
decision-making, it is by remembering felt moments, not by looking back at mental images that 
are themselves forgeries of forgeries. Thus, before we commit and make-up our minds we can, 
and should, pause to consider that each and every moment is a lifetime--forever being 
remembered or forgotten. 
As mover-moving-in-endless-motion, we are not intimidated by time. For time rushes us 
like an impatient taxidriver, continuously honking his horn, anxious to receive his fare. We can 
exercise our will to reject the ephemeral belief that every moment should be lived as if it is the 
last, and, instead, we can choose to appreciate every moment as if it is the first. We can factor out 
time in order to attend to those we count on and who, in turn, count on us. Yet, to call the bluff of 
time, the threat of its finitude, we must be aware of its relativity. For decisions in the air have the 
power of momentum, like a coin tossed in a game of chance. The richness of this moment is in 
the not knowing that precedes the outcome. To appreciate movement requires that we do not 
become distracted by the gravitational pull of time. In an attempt to genuinely think myself back 
to an awareness of m a t  it is like to make decisions, I have drawn a mental picture of constructed 
ideas about time (and its temporal situatedness). And, in moving through these words, I hope I 
have raised to awareness the intellectual pause--so that as poets who dwell-in-the-world we think 
before we act and act with an appreciation for the dynamics of our interconnectedness. For 
leadership is not a title but an act that momentarily blossoms in one and in all 
Let us not waste our time in idle discourse!. . .Let us do something, while we 
have the chance! It is not every day that we are needed.. . .at this place, at this 
moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make the 
most of it, before it is too late! 
(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act 11) 
EPILOGUE 
Dear reader, a few words before we part ways. If you have had as much fun reading this 
work as I did writing. it, then there is much to play with. Go forth and have fun. On the other 
hand, if this was a strange and, at times, painful or confusing reading experience, rest assure I, 
too, had to suffer through many revisions. Either way, we are survivors. If some of the 
philosophical ideas are new to you, please do not be discouraged. They were new to me once, as 
well. And many of the ideas take a lifetime to truly begin to understand them. Nonetheless, if you 
are reading this epilogue, then you are already half way there. This work has been an attempt to 
raise to awareness the intellectual pause, the pre-decision-making moment. Through the use of 
metaphorical discourse, time and temporality have been deconstructed. But no need to fret, these 
worldviews (i.e., time and temporality) are so resilient that they reconstruct themselves as they 
are being deconstructed. 
In what way can this phenomenological-hermeneutical work contribution to leadership 
(. 
discourse? Well, it is.a different way at coming to understand the elephant. This is to say, a body 
of knowledge can be an entity onto itself, but it could never claim a monopoly on the subject of 
inquiry. If we truly want change, then we need to ask some profound questions. Because of their 
nature, these questions take time to answer. For example, three such questions that come to mind 
are What is it that I don't like about my classroom? my school? my district?' What is it that I 
want?' and What is it that I actually do in my classroom? my school? my district?' At first, these 
seem like relatively simple questions; but if, for instance, one decided to spend the good part of a 
school year contemplating these questions, it would soon become apparent that as they transform 
themselves into questions of situatedness the layers of possible answers makes the whole inquiry 
a very complex undertaking. Little wonder mission statements become blinding statements, even 
before the ink is dry. Consequently, we quickly discover that it is not a matter of simplicity, but a 
matter of clarity. 
Clarity is an exercise in visualization. For example, in attempting to address the question 
What is it like to make decisions?' time turned to temporal awareness, which turned to 
movement, and returned as dialogue. To view these ideas from a two dimensional perspective, 
they form a hierarchical body of knowledge: where at the bottom we have time, and, as we 
progressively move up the ladder, the next level is temporality, above that is movement, and 
above that is dialogue. But to view the same ideas from a three dimensional perspective and look 
I-. 
down at this tower ofknowledge, what we see, instead, are expanding rings: where at the centre 
we see time and, like radiating waves, each ring expands the idea of time yet further, until it 
reaches the outer rim of dialogue, itself becoming the event horizon of this body of knowledge. 
Schools project an image of linearity and square rooted knowledge that keeps us boxed 
in. Yet, all of us who are involved in schools, from bus drivers to superintendents, feel that this 
daily reality has trapped us, like a flipper-flapper booklet, no matter how many times we turn the 
page, we always return to where we started. We also know that what will allows us to progress is 
creativity. The problem is that creativity requires a language of the here and now. We have a 
vague understanding of the presence of this language in art, but it is completely foreign to the 
organizers of schools, from classrooms to districts. Even if we begin with one word at a time, and 
initially form a broken-English 1. of creative language, let us begin, even if the first word is "Og!" 
*I 
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